Dallas Police Department
Violent Crime Reduction Plan
Year 1 Evaluation

Michael Smith, J.D., Ph.D.
Rob Tillyer, Ph.D.
Brandon Tregle, J.D., Ph.D.
University of Texas at San Antonio

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Executive Summary

Beginning in May 2021, the Dallas Police Department began executing a three-part strategic plan to reduce violent crime adopted by the City of Dallas in Spring 2021 (hereafter referred to as the "Crime Plan"). To date, Crime Plan implementation efforts have largely focused on hot spots policing – the deployment of police officers to small areas (300' x 300' grids) of high violent crime – in an effort to reduce the occurrence of these violence in these areas. Efforts to operationalize the mid-term strategy, Place Network Investigations (PNI), began in late 2021 and included extensive planning and organizational adjustments in preparation for the launch of two pilot PNI sites in Spring 2022. The mid-term PNI strategy targets high crime places for extensive police and non-police (e.g. code enforcement, blight abatement) interventions designed to address the underlying conditions that help give rise to violent crime. Two sites – (1) an apartment complex at 3550 E. Overton Road, and (2) a strip shopping center and nearby apartments centered around 11700 Ferguson Road – were chosen as the first two pilot sites.

This is the fourth report in a series that documents and evaluates the actions and impacts of the Crime Plan. It summarizes the methodology and results of an independent, empirical assessment of the implementation and impact of the near- and mid-term strategies over the past year. The report contains a section examining city-wide violent crime trends at the end of year one of the Crime Plan (May 2021-May 2022) compared to the two previous years. It also examines the impact of the hot spots and PNI strategies that have been implemented to date, and it contains a section that focuses specifically on the Period 4 results (Apr-Jun 2022), Finally, it updates the Period 2 report by assessing the fidelity of the hot spots strategy over the last six months since the Period 2 report was issued in January 2022.

Year to Year Comparison

The year-to-year analyses compared the city-wide and crime-specific levels of violent crime in the Crime Plan year (May 2021-May 2022) to the previous two years and demonstrated:
- An upward trend in violent crime in the three years (2018-2020) leading up to the Crime Plan year was reversed and Part 1 violent crime fell about 6% during the Crime Plan year compared to the year before
- The city-wide level of violent street crime was 11.5% lower in the Crime Plan year compared to the May 2020-May 2021 period
- The city-wide level of violent street crime was 18% lower in the Crime Plan year compared to the May 2019-May 2020 period

A second analysis also compared violent crime subtypes in the Crime Plan year to the previous year.
- City-wide murders were 13% lower during the Crime Plan year compared to the previous year (2020-21).

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- City-wide robberies fell 21% (individual robberies) and 17% (business robberies) during the Crime Plan year compared to the May 2020-May 2021 period.
- Aggravated assaults (non-family violence) were reduced 5% in the Crime Plan year compared to the previous 12 months.
- The number of victims of violent crime decreased by 8% in the Crime Plan year compared to the June 2020-May 2021 period.

Temporal Assessment of Crime in Grids

First, data from July 2020-June 2022 were analyzed by month with the following results:
- In treatment grids, the monthly average of violent crime incidents in treatment grids dropped between 33-41% when compared to the pre-treatment monthly averages
- Once treatment was discontinued, the treated grids continued to experience noticeable reductions in monthly crime compared to the pre-treatment period (between 27-40%)
- Catchment grids (those in the immediate geographic proximity to the treated grids) experienced no crime displacement on average; in fact, monthly average counts of violent crime in the catchment areas fell slightly from 54.5 in the pre-treatment period to 52.3 during treatment

A second analysis of violent crime in the grids assessed the portion of city-wide violent crime contributed by the treated grids.
- In the 10 months prior to treatment, the grids selected for treatment accounted for approximately 5% of city-wide violent crime
- Once treatment was applied (across four periods), violent crime in grids contributed only 2-3% to city-wide crime
- By treating 115 of the roughly 101,000 grids across the city, the percentage of crime city-wide contributed by those grids was reduced by more than 40%.

To address the potential for regression to the mean, a third analysis was conducted to assess the impact of the hot spots treatment on violent crime in the treated grids while controlling for earlier spikes in crime that were used to select the grids for treatment in the first place. Difference-in-differences statistical models were used to estimate the percentage of crime reduction in the treated grids that was attributable to the treatment.
- Results showed that treatment grids averaged a 10.7% reduction in violent crime incidents during treatment
- Analysis for spillover effects revealed that crime fell slightly (0.4% on average) in catchment area grids, confirming that these areas benefited from the treatment and did not experience crime displacement on average.

Period 4 Treatment Evaluation

Specific analyses of the 46 grids treated in Period 4 (April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022) also was conducted. Results revealed the following:

- Violent crime fell 54.6% in treated grids when compared to pre-treatment weekly averages
- Outside of the treatment grids, violent crime increased 34% in non-treatment/catchment grids when comparing pre- and post-treatment weekly averages
- While violent crime increased 28.9% in catchment grids during the treatment period, this increase was about 5% *less* than in non-catchment grids and provides evidence that the surrounding catchment grids benefited from the treatment
- The number of arrests in treatment grids trailed the overall city-wide arrests levels, and warrant arrests in the treated grids declined in the post-intervention period
- Calls for service were higher throughout the city, but decreased in the treatment grids.

Hot Spot Fidelity

Fidelity refers to the extent to which the DPD deployed officers to the designated high visibility treatment grids during the appropriate days and times as identified by the hot spots analysis. These analyses were conducted for Periods 3 & 4 at the division level; results from Periods 1 & 2 can be found in the Period 2 Report.

- In Period 3, the overall fidelity rate was 79% across all divisions
- In Period 4, the overall fidelity rate improved to 89% across all divisions

Place Network Investigations (PNI) Intervention

Key findings from the initial analysis of the two PNI pilot sites include the following:

- Assessment of the implementation efforts revealed some gaps that need to be addressed, including lack of data on some specific metrics, the challenges of coordinating a multi-agency effort, and a lack of experience with this type of strategy.
- To date, metrics (i.e., crime, victims, arrest, and calls for service) do not reveal a measurable violent crime reduction impact at the Ferguson Road location. Consistent with broader trends in the Northeast patrol division in spring 2022, violent crime actually increased by about 33% at the Ferguson Road location.
- In contrast, a substantial *crime reduction* effect was documented at the Overton Rd. site pre vs. post-PNI implementation.
- While great effort and progress have been made toward executing the mid-term strategy, considerable work is still needed to reach the strategy's potential to reduce and disrupt violent crime at these locations, particularly at the Ferguson Road site.

- Initial challenges were identified and adjustments to the PNI strategy were made, including, expanding the DPD working group, developing greater cooperation with and reliance on the Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions (OIPSS), and enhanced intelligence gathering efforts.
- Moving forward, DPD plans to create a second PNI team that will allow it to expand the number of sites undergoing PNI treatment.

1. Overview

Beginning in May 2021, the Dallas Police Department began executing a three-part strategic plan to reduce violent crime adopted by the City of Dallas in Spring 2021 (hereafter referred to as the "Crime Plan"). To date, Crime Plan implementation efforts have largely focused on hot spots policing – the deployment of police officers to small areas (300' x 300' grids) of high violent crime – in an effort to reduce the occurrence of violence in these areas. Efforts to operationalize the mid-term strategy, Place Network Investigations (PNI), began in late 2021 and included extensive planning and organizational adjustments in preparation for the launch of two pilot PNI sites in Spring 2022. In late Spring 2022, planning and discussions got underway for implementation of the long-term strategy – focused deterrence – but to date, no concrete implementation steps have been taken with respect to this strategy.

This is the fourth report in a series that documents and evaluates the actions and impacts of the Crime Plan. It summarizes the methodology and results of an independent, empirical assessment of the implementation and impact of the near- and mid-term strategies over the past year. Various data sources and analytic approaches were used to evaluate the hot spots strategy and the efforts at the PNI pilot locations. The report is organized into several sections that summarize these efforts and together provide a comprehensive assessment of the Crime Plan to date.

Following this overview, Section 2 examines overall city-wide trends in violent crime at the end of year one of the Crime Plan (May 2021-May 2022). Section 3 examines the hot spot grids during the past two years and specifically focuses on the treatment effect within grids. Section 4 reports on crime and related activity within the most recent period of treatment (Period 4)[1]. Section 5 updates the Period 2 report on plan fidelity and assesses the fidelity of the hot spots strategy in Periods 3 & 4.

Section 6 assesses the implementation and impact of the first two PNI locations, including a description of the pre-launch work completed. The final section of the report serves as its conclusion and summary of the main findings. Following the Conclusion is a list of all references and an appendix that includes supplemental materials.

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[1] Assessments of previous treatment periods are available in the Period 1, Period 2, and Period 3 reports.

2. Year to Year Comparison

This section of the report shows year-to-year changes in crime and victimization metrics from 2019 through 2022. Its purpose is to compare crime and victimization 1-2 years before the Crime Plan went into effect to crime trends following implementation of the plan. These comparisons are useful for evaluating the potential city-wide impact of the hot spots and PNI strategies. The hot spots strategy targeted only about 155 unique grids during the first year, while PNI focused on two areas of Dallas – the Volara Apartments at 3550 E. Overton Road and a strip shopping center and adjacent apartments centered around 11700 Ferguson Road. Hot spot treated grids accounted for only about 0.15% of the more than 101,000 grids in Dallas.

Figure 2.1 below shows the trend in Part 1 violent offenses (murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and sexual assault) from 2018 through 2020. This covers a three-year period leading up the implementation of the Crime Plan in May 2021. The red trend line shows a steady increase in crime over this period and is what led to the development and implementation of the Crime Plan. Over the three year period, violent crime increased approximately 26.7%.

Figure 2.1: Dallas Violent Crime Offenses - 2018-2020

Part I Violent Crime Offense Count by Month
Jan 2018-Dec 2020

Figure 2.2 shows the trend in overall violent crime since the Crime Plan began in May 2021. During Year 1 of the Crime Plan, the upward trend shown above in Figure 2.1 was reversed, and violent crime fell approximately 6% compared to the previous year.

Figure 2.2: Dallas Violent Crime Offenses - Crime Plan Year (May 2021-April 2022)

Part I Violent Crime Offense Count by Month
May 2021-Apr 2022

Violent Street Crime

Keeping in mind the change in overall violent crime outlined above since the Crime Plan began, the remainder of this report focuses on measuring the impact of the Crime Plan on *violent street crime.* For these purposes, *violent street crime* is defined as murder, robbery (individual and business), and non-family violence aggravated assault. We assess the impact of the Plan on these crimes in detail because the Crime Plan is purposely designed to impact them. Strategies to reduce domestic violence and/or sexual assault, for example, are quite different from the strategies that make up the Crime Plan. While the year-over-year reduction in *all types* of serious violent crime is laudable, the Crime Plan was primarily designed to help control *violent street crime*. We turn now to those results.

Table 2.1 below presents results from the evaluation of violent street crime throughout the city during the most recent three-year period, including the Crime Plan year. The data cover all months from May 2019 through May 6, 2022. Table 2.1 provides a comparison of violent crime for the Crime Plan's first year as well as each of the two years prior to implementation. Overall, violent street crime in Dallas decreased during the first year of the Crime Plan compared to each of the two prior years. During the first year of the Crime Plan (May 7, 2021, to May 6, 2022), violent crime dropped 17.95% compared to the same period two years prior (May 2019 to May 2020), and it fell 11.48% compared to the immediately preceding year.

Table 2.1: Year-Over-Year (May 7, 2021 – May 6, 2022)

	Totals			Percent Change	
	5/7/19 – 5/6/20 (Comparison Period 1)	5/7/20 – 5/6/21 (Comparison Period 2)	5/7/21 – 5/6/22 (Crime Plan Intervention)	Crime Plan vs. Comparison Period 1	Crime Plan vs. Comparison Period 2
All Violent Crime	8,100	7,508	6,646	-17.95%	-11.48%

Figure 2.3 illustrates the effect of the Crime Plan across the three-year period. In May 2021 when the Crime Plan began, violent crime was at about the same level as it was in May 2020. From there and with some seasonal variation, the 2021 monthly crime levels began to drop. The late summer crime drop evident across all three years was steeper in 2021 than in the previous years, and after a slight uptick in October, crime continued to fall through the end of 2021. From there, the crime decline is most evident at the start of period 3 when crime decreased sharply in the early months of 2022. As noted above, the fourth quarter showed an uptick in violence during the final two months of the Crime Plan year. Still, violent crime is trending downward across the three-year period examined here and remains at lower levels than those observed prior the Crime Plan's implementation.

Figure 2.3: 2019 to 2022 Violent Crime

Dallas Violent Crime June 2019 - April 2022

Legend:
- P1 Treatment
- P2 Treatment
- P3 Treatment
- P4 Treatment
- All Violent Crime
- Linear (All Violent Crime)

Table 2.2 below presents data from the Crime Plan's first 10 months. March and April 2022 were challenging months in Dallas, and the City experienced a significant uptick in violent crime during the final two months of Year 1 of the Crime Plan, particularly for murder. Table 2.2 demonstrates how steeply violent crime had fallen during the first ten months of the Crime Plan compared to how Year 1 ended (see Table 1 above). Taken together, the findings from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 highlight the potential impact of the Crime Plan and that much work remains to be done to reduce levels of violence and prevent spikes in crime like those that occurred in March and April 2022.

Table 2.2: Year-Over-Year First Ten Months (May 7, 2020 – February 28, 2022)

	Totals		Percent Change
	5/7/20 - 2/28/21 (Comparison Period)	5/7/21 - 2/28/2022 (Crime Plan Intervention)	Crime Plan (first 10 mos.) vs. Prior Year 10 mos.
All Violent Crime	6,315	5,353	-15.23%
Murder	228	179	-21.49%
Robbery: Individual	2,192	1,621	-26.05%
Robbery: Business	486	362	-25.51%
Aggravated Assault (NFV)	3,465	3,240	-6.49%

The downward trend in violent crime was evident across all violent crime subtypes in the most recent year comparison. Table 2.3 presents a comparison of violent crime subtypes between the Crime Plan Year and the previous year.

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Table 2.3: Year to Year Comparison by Subtype (May 7, 2020 – May 6, 2022)

	Totals		Percent Change
	5/7/20 – 5/6/21 (Comparison Period)	5/7/21 – 5/6/22 (Crime Plan Intervention)	Crime Plan vs. Comparison Period
Murder	261	227	-13.03%
Robbery: Individual	2,566	2,016	-21.43%
Robbery: Business	545	453	-16.88%
Aggravated Assault (NFV)	4,204	4,010	-4.61%

Figure 2.4 provides a year-to-year comparison of violent crime in Dallas by subtype across the last two years. Of note, all subtypes of violent crime increased prior to the Crime Plan's implementation. Though all subtypes decreased since implementation, the magnitude of decrease varied by type. While the effects on murders and robberies of businesses are less pronounced given the lower number of incidents, the Crime Plan's effect is more evident on the subtypes that occur most often. After the third period began at the end of 2021, aggravated assaults and robberies of individuals fell to their lowest points during the three-year period.

Figure 2.4: Year-To-Year by Crime Subtype (June 2019 – April 2022)

Victims

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 below examine year-to-year changes in the number of violent crime victims in Dallas. One of the stated goals of the DPD Crime Plan is to reduce the number of violent crime

victims. Thus, these analyses are similar to the results reported above in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 but focus specifically on the number of reported victims of violent crime from July 2020 to April 2022. Figure 2.5 indicates an 8% reduction in the number of violent crime victims during the period of May 2021 to May 2022 (Crime Plan implementation period) compared to the previous year's period.

Figure 2.5: Year-to-Year Victims City-Wide

Finally, Figure 2.6 shows the trend in number of violent crime victims across the last three years by violent crime subtype. Across all subtypes, the number of violent crime victims sharply decreased after implementation of the Crime Plan. Following a seasonal spike in crime, violent crime victimization is currently trending downward across all subtypes with the exception of robberies of businesses. Nationally, robberies also have shown double-digit increases during the first half of 2022 compared to 2021 (Rosenfeld et al., 2022).

Figure 2.6: 2019 to 2022 Victims (By Subtype)

Dallas Crime Victims July 2020 - April 2022 (By Subtype)

3. Temporal Assessment of Crime in Grids

This section examines crime patterns in treatment and catchment grids across a two-year period. It explores how crime changed across pre-treatment and treatment periods, and, importantly, once treatment was discontinued. Several different analyses were undertaken to examine changes to crime in the treatment and catchment grids before and after the Crime Plan went into effect.

__Methodology__

The evaluation of treatment grids over time is focused on answering the following research questions:

1. What are the crime patterns in treatment and catchment area grids over time?
    a. What is the long-term effect on crime once treatment is removed?
    b. Is there evidence of displacement or diffusion of benefits (see below for discussion of these concepts) in the catchment areas?
    c. How does treated grid crime relate to city-wide crime levels?
2. Is a change in grid crime linked to the treatment itself rather than to naturally occurring patterns or other non-treatment influences on crime in the grids?

The focus on treatment grids, in particular, allows for an assessment of two related concepts. First, grids can be evaluated for changes in crime incidents prior to the treatment as compared to crime levels once treatment was initiated. This is referred to as an *outcome* evaluation and addresses the question of whether crime patterns changed once treatment began. The period specific reports produced to date provided information on this question, but they did not address the second component of a thorough assessment. An *impact* assessment focuses on whether any changes in crime levels evidenced once treatment began can be associated with the treatment rather than another cause. In other words, an impact assessment attempts to confirm that any crime reduction benefit is tied to the crime reduction strategy and is not the result of some other unmeasured reason. Any reduction in crime within the treated grids is valuable (i.e., outcome), but it is important to identify whether or not it was the actions undertaken in the grids that were directly responsible for observed reductions in crime (i.e., impact). This section will address both of these concepts and provide insight into how crime changed (or did not) within the treated grids across the four treatment periods.

This section will also assess the catchment areas that surround each treated grid to consider the level of crime in the immediate geographic areas surrounding the treated grids. Two potential scenarios are relevant to consider when assessing catchment areas. It may be that crime in the catchment area increased once treatment began in nearby grids. If observed, the concern with such a pattern is that crime may have been *displaced* from the treated grids to the catchment grids. Theoretically, this is not likely to occur (e.g., Routine Activities Theory), and empirically, there is limited evidence that displacement occurs as the result of hot spots interventions. Nonetheless,

displacement is a possibility that should be explored. The second scenario is that the catchment grids may have experienced a reduction in crime that was tied to the treatment that occurred in nearby grids; this is referred to as a *diffusion of benefits*. In other words, the nearby grids may have received a crime reduction *benefit* due to their geographic proximity to the police intervention. An assessment of crime displacement or diffusion of benefits can be made by comparing catchment grid crime levels to city-wide crime levels.

To address these research questions and issues, violent crime incidents that occurred between July 2020 and June 2022 were analyzed using a variety of analytic approaches. This time period covers a two-year window that includes the Crime Plan year (May 2021-Jun 2022) and the year before. The specific crime types and time periods examined included violent crime incidents per month across the 24 months and across the following crime treatment periods:

- Pre-intervention period: Jul 2020-April 2021
- Period 1 Treatment: May 2021-August 2021
- Period 2 Treatment: September 2021-December 2021
- Period 3 Treatment: January 2022-March 2022
- Period 4 Treatment: April 2022-June 2022

The following sub-sections provide responses to the research questions and include a description of the specific methodological approaches and analytic techniques employed.

Crime Patterns Over Time

Grids by Period

To assess how crime patterns changes over time, grids selected for treatment in a specific time period were grouped together. For example, all 46 grids treated in Period 1 were grouped and assessed as a collective and all 51 grids treated in Period 2 were grouped for analysis purposes. The same procedure was applied to Period 3 and Period 4 treatment grids, and the same procedure was applied to the catchment grids.

The Period 1-4 grids were then assessed across two years (July 2020-June 2022). For all grid periods (i.e., Period 1-4 grids), a pre-treatment monthly average of violent crime incidents and a treatment monthly average of violent crime incidents were calculated. Counts of violent crime incidents per month within grid periods also were calculated. This formed the foundation of the initial assessment of treatment and catchment grid crime levels over time. Tables 3.1-3.3 summarize the patterns of crime during the first three treatment periods using this methodology. Period 4 results are reported separately in Section 4 of the report.

Table 3.1 summarizes the crime patterns for Period 1 grids (treatment and catchment) over time. Period 1 treatment grids in the pre-treatment period (July 2020-April 2021) experienced an average of 28.5 violent crimes per month. In contrast, during the treatment period (May 2021-August 2021), an average of 19.3 violent crimes occurred per month within the Period 1 treatment grids.

This represents a 32.5% reduction in crime during the treatment period. Period 1 treatment grids also experienced an average reduction in violent crime incidents of 36.5% across the ten post-treatment months compared to the pre-treatment monthly average. Period 1 catchment grids experienced a slight overall reduction in crime compared to their pre-treatment violent crime monthly average (52.3 vs. 54.5). Overall, the Period 1 catchment grids experienced a diffusion of post-treatment benefits equivalent to a -13.9% reduction in violent crime compared to pre-treatment levels.

Table 3.1: Period 1 Treatment & Catchment Grids-Crime Incidents and Percent Change

	Pre-Treatment (Jul 2020-Apr 2021)	Treatment (May 2021-Aug 2021)		Post-Treatment (Sep 2021-Jun 2022)	
	Monthly Average	*Monthly Average*	*% Change*	*Monthly Average*	*% Change*
P1 Treatment Grids	28.5	19.3	-32.5%	18.1	-36.5%
P1 Catchment Grids	54.5	52.3	-4.1%	46.9	-13.9%

% Change is based on pre-treatment monthly average.

Table 3.2 examines Period 2 (Sep-Dec 2021) grids and includes an adjustment for the pre-treatment period comparison months (Jul 2020 – Aug 2021). Period 2 treated grids experienced a 40.8% reduction in average monthly violent crime incidents during the treatment period (18.0) compared to the pre-treatment period (30.4). Period 2 treatment grids also experienced a 39.7% reduction in violent crime incidents in the months following treatment compared to the pre-treatment monthly average of crime incidents. Period 2 catchment grids experienced a reduction in monthly average crime incidents during the treatment period (56.8) compared to the pre-intervention period (66.4); a 14.5% reduction. The Period 2 catchment grids experienced an 8.3% reduction in post-treatment monthly violent crime incidents compared to the pre-treatment monthly average.

Table 3.2: Period 2 Treatment & Catchment Grids-Crime Incidents and Percent Change

	Pre-Treatment (Jul 2020-Aug 2021)	Treatment (Sep 2021-Dec 2021)		Post-Treatment (Jan 2022-Jun 2022)	
	Monthly Average	*Monthly Average*	*% Change*	*Monthly Average*	*% Change*
P2 Treatment Grids	30.4	18.0	-40.8%	18.3	-39.7%
P2 Catchment Grids	66.4	56.8	-14.5%	60.8	-8.3%

% Change is based on pre-treatment monthly average.

Finally, the Period 3 grids were analyzed in an identical manner with a requisite adjustment in the pre-treatment comparison period to reflect the start of the treatment period in January 2022. Of note, the post-treatment analyses were based on only three months of data; thus, implications for

the long-term impact of treatment should be tempered for these grids. As reported in Table 3.3, Period 3 treatment grids experienced a 41.3% reduction in their average monthly crime incidents during treatment compared to the pre-treatment monthly average. The subsequent months demonstrated an average reduction of 27.2%. Period 3 catchment grids also demonstrated a 11.5% reduction in average monthly crime incidents during the treatment period (60.7) compared to the pre-treatment period (68.6) and an 0.8% decrease in the post-treatment months.

Table 3.3: Period 3 Treatment & Catchment Grids-Crime Incidents and Percent Change

	Pre-Treatment (Jul 2020-Dec 2021)	Treatment (Jan 2022-Mar 2022)		Post-Treatment (Apr 2022-Jun 2022)	
	Monthly Average	*Monthly Average*	*% Change*	*Monthly Average*	*% Change*
P3 Treatment Grids	26.1	15.3	-41.3%	19.0	-27.2%
P3 Catchment Grids	68.6	60.7	-11.5%	68.0	-0.8%

% Change is based on pre-treatment monthly average.

Grids by Month

The crime patterns within the treated and catchment grids for Periods 1-4 also were assessed by month and graphed in Figures 3.1-3.2. These visual representations provide a more granular picture of the monthly counts of violent crime in the treatment and catchment grids. For each period, the solid line represents the count of violent crime within the treated grids, the dotted line reflects the count of violent crime in the catchment grids, and the vertical line indicates the beginning of treatment. Period 1 is orange (Figure 3.1), Period 2 is blue (Figure 3.1), Period 3 is green (Figure 3.2), and Period 4 is red (Figure 3.2).

These graphs confirm what previous analyses indicated; violent crime incidents were not only reduced in the treated grids (solid lines), but the effect was prolonged after the treatment was discontinued in most cases. It also demonstrates the accuracy of grid selection for treatment as all grids experienced a spike in violent crime prior to their selection for treatment. These graphs also largely confirm that the catchment areas (dotted lines) did not experience a spike in violent crime as a result of treatment being applied to neighboring grids. There is some increase in the catchment grids in Spring 2022 (and in treated grids as well), but as previously noted, to fully assess whether this is an example of displacement or diffusion of benefits, a comparison to the city-wide level is necessary. Please see the sub-section on Period 4 results for a detailed assessment of this possibility.

While these graphs provide greater detail about the immediate and long-term trends for each of the grid groups, they also reveal valuable information about the timing of the reduction in crime incidents. As noted previously, the slope of crime reduction begins about a month prior to the intervention in all periods. This pattern suggests a potential threat to the validity of the treatment.

Regression to the mean occurs when a change in policy is applied immediately after a high (or low) level of activity. This concept refers to the notion that extremely high (or low) levels of activity will naturally return to a more 'normal' level over time regardless of whether the policy was implemented. In this case, the question is whether criminal activity would have dropped to a lower level regardless of the police actions taken to reduce it. Further assessment of this question is provided in the Treatment Impact section below.

Figure 3.1: Monthly Violent Crime Incidents-Period 1 & 2 Treatment and Catchment Grids

Monthly Violent Crime Incidents (Jul 2020 - June 2022):
Period 1 & 2 Treatment and Catchment Grids

Figure 3.2: Monthly Violent Crime Incidents-Period 3 & 4 Treatment and Catchment Grids

Monthly Violent Crime Incidents (Jul 2020 - June 2022):
Periods 3 & 4 Treatment and Catchment Grids

Grid vs. City-Wide Crime

A final method of assessing how the treatment of grids influenced crime is to compare violent crime in the treated grids against the broader city-wide patterns. To address this, the grids treated in each period were grouped (process is described above) to produce Period 1, Period 2, Period 3, and Period 4 grids. These groupings were then assessed to see how much of city-wide crime they accounted for in the pre-treatment period (standardized to 10 months for all groups) compared to the post-treatment periods. Then, a simple percent difference was calculated to see the 'effect' of the treatment. If the Crime Plan treatments impacted crime in the targeted grids, then their contribution to overall crime in the city should have dropped after the interventions went into effect. Indeed, the hot spots strategy is based on the idea of targeting the most violence-prone grids in the city with the goal of reducing crime overall by lowering the temperature on these 'hot' places.

Table 3.4 summarizes this analysis. Period 1 grids accounted for 4.8% of city-wide crime in the 10 months prior to treatment. During treatment, the Period 1 grids accounted for 3.2% of city-wide crime, which represents a 33% reduction in the contribution to overall crime made by these grids once treatment was applied. The contribution of Period 2 & 3 grids to violent crime city-wide was 40% lower during the treatment period compared to the pre-treatment period. Finally, Period 4 grids showed the biggest reduction in their contribution to city-wide crime (-55%), which aligns with the uptick in city-wide crime during Period 4.

Importantly, this analysis should not be interpreted to mean that city-wide crime necessarily fell as a result of the treatment applied to selected grids. Rather, it allows for an assessment of the impact on crime in the grids relative to the broader patterns in the city. For example, as city-wide crime increased in Period 4, the percentage of crime occurring in the treated grids (2.2%) was lower than in any other period and represented a 55% reduction in the percentage of city-wide crime contributed by the Period 4 grids compared to their pre-treatment contribution. This is a product not only of the crime suppression effect happening within the grids but also of how grid crime activity compares to the broader crime patterns. That said, the data in Table 3.4 provides good evidence that the hot spots strategy is working to reduce the percentage of overall violence in the city being driven by its most violent places.

Table 3.4: Grid Crime vs. City-Wide Crime

	Previous 10 Month Average	Treatment Average	% Change in Contribution
P1 Grid Crime - % of City-Wide	4.8%	3.2%	-33%
P2 Grid Crime - % of City-Wide	5.8%	3.5%	-40%
P3 Grid Crime - % of City-Wide	5.3%	3.0%	-40%
P4 Grid Crime - % of City-Wide	4.9%	2.2%	-55%

Treatment Impact

As noted previously, it is important to distinguish between an *outcome* effect when crime is reduced in the targeted areas vs. an *impact* effect in which the reduction in crime is a result of the actions taken to affect that change. There is no doubt that the evidence to date from the analyses in this report, combined with the previous Period specific reports, demonstrate an outcome effect. The key question that remains is whether this crime reduction pattern can be attributed to the actions of the Crime Plan.

Difference-in-Differences Analysis

In the year since the hot spots intervention strategy went into effect, previous UTSA evaluation reports have documented significant reductions in violent crime in the treated hot spots (grids) before and after treatment began. On average, violent crime fell more than 50% in the treated grids during the treatment periods compared to the three months leading up to treatment. This pattern has been consistently documented across all intervention periods, including in Period 4 (Apr-Jun 2022) shown below in this report. Companion analyses examining potential spatial displacement of crime from treated grids into nearby non-treated grids (catchment grids) have shown some evidence of displacement in a few DPD patrol divisions in some intervention periods but have not revealed a consistent pattern of displacement. In fact, catchment grids have been more likely to show crime reductions (termed "diffusion of benefits") than crime increases that could be attributable to displacement.

While this uniform pattern of violence reduction in the treated hot spots combined with no consistent evidence of displacement has been encouraging, the period hot spots data also have revealed a recurring pattern of large crime spikes in grids targeted for treatment prior to the start of treatment, followed by falling crime levels in the targeted grids even *before* treatment began. Grids are selected for treatment *because* they show elevated rates of violent crime in the previous three months; therefore, crime likely would fall back to an average level (albeit likely higher than non-treated grids) over time regardless of whether the police intervened in those high crime grids. Statisticians call this cyclical pattern in time-series data "regression to the mean," meaning that positive and negative spikes in a data series tend to *regress* back to the average of the series over time.

In order to test for whether the large reductions in crime observed in the treated hot spots would have occurred despite treatment (the "regression to the mean" effect), the UTSA research team conducted a difference-in-differences analysis that compared the change in crime levels in the treated grids to the change in crime levels in untreated grids. Difference-in-differences is a useful econometric technique for examining the change in a population following treatment relative to the change in a similar population that was not treated (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Wooldridge, 2010). In our case, the difference-in-differences analysis is complicated by the fact that there are no closely matched non-treated grids (other than those nearby) to serve as the counterfactual

because grids are selected for treatment based on their unusually high levels of violent crime in the previous 90 days. We accounted for this complexity by segmenting the analysis into months prior to treatment, months during treatment, and months post-treatment to investigate change in crime levels in the treated grids relative to their already elevated levels of crime before treatment began (MacDonald et al., 2016).

In conducting these difference-in-differences analyses, we had three research questions in mind:
1. What was the overall average treatment effect in the treated hot spot grids relative to non-treated grids?
2. Was there evidence of crime displacement to grids immediately surrounding the treated grids, again relative to other non-treated grids?
3. Did crime reduction benefits persist after treatment ended?

Table 3.5 shows the effect of the hot spots treatment on violent street crime in the treated grids compared to non-treated grids. Importantly, the difference-in-differences statistical modeling underlying this table controls for the rise in crime observed in the treated grids across all four treatment periods in the three months leading up to the beginning of treatment. Thus, the model takes into account the "regression to the mean" problem discussed above and provides an estimate of the reduction in crime within the treated grids attributable to the treatment itself.

Table 3.5: Difference in Difference Models – Treatment Effect

	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	Impact on Crime
Average Treatment Effect	-.107***	.026	-10.7%

***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05; This model controls for 3 months of pre-treatment crime.

The coefficient shown in the table (-.107) suggests that the hot spots treatment reduced the average expected monthly count of violent crime in the treated grids by 10.7%. Monthly analyses (not shown) indicated that violent crime increased slightly in the first month of treatment and then dropped by about 9% in the second treatment month and 8% in the third month compared to non-treated grids.

While the average crime reductions reported in the quarterly reports (>50%) were much higher, those descriptive analyses did not account for potential regression to the mean. This analysis takes those natural time series trends into account to produce a more accurate estimate of the crime reduction effects of the hot spots treatment in Dallas. An almost 11% decrease in violent crime is a relatively small but statistically significant reduction in violence. To put the Dallas results in perspective, Braga et al.'s (2019) meta-analysis of 62 hot spots policing programs found a mean

effect size of .102[2] across 44 studies that evaluated hot spots treatment impacts on violent crime. This suggests that other hot spots studies also produced comparably small but statistically significant reductions in violent crime when measured for that outcome.

Table 3.6 investigates possible displacement of crime to grids adjacent to and within about 1,000 feet of the treated grids in all directions. Overall, these catchment areas experienced a slight decrease in violent crime (-0.04) compared to other non-treated grids, which indicates that on average, the hot spots strategy did not displace crime into the surrounding areas. On the contrary, the catchment areas experienced a slight diffusion of crime reduction benefits because of their proximity to the treated grids.

Table 3.6: Difference in Difference Models – Catchment Grids

	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	Spillover
Average Catchment Effect	-.004**	.001	-0.04%

***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05

Finally, Table 3.7 examines the impact of the hot spots strategy on crime in the treated grids one month *after* treatment was withdrawn. This table addresses the third research question outlined above: Did crime reduction benefits persist after treatment ended? While the effect was not statistically significant, the negative regression coefficient (-.117) was in the expected direction and suggests that crime may have remained 11.7% lower than expected compared to non-treated grids in the month after treatment ended.

Table 3.7: Difference in Difference Models – Treatment Grids, Post-Treatment Effect

	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	Post-Treatment Effect
Average Post-Treatment: Month 1	-.117	.072	-11.7%

***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05; This model controls for 2 months of pre-treatment crime and all months of treatment crime.

Taken together, the results from the difference-in-differences analyses confirm the effectiveness of the hot spots strategy in reducing violent crime in and around the targeted hot spots, and they suggest that the greatest crime reduction benefit is observed in the second month of treatment. In Year 2 of Crime Plan implementation, we recommend that DPD consider shortening the hot spots intervention periods to 60 days (down from 90 days), which will allow more grids to be treated throughout the year while leveraging the maximum benefits obtained in the first 60 days of treatment.

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[2] The effect sizes reported by Braga et al. are based on Cohen's d. As a general rule of thumb, Cohen (1988) suggested the following effect size benchmarks to assist in interpreting the statistic: small (*d*=0.2), medium (*d*=0.5), large (*d*=0.8).

4. Period 4 Treatment Evaluation

Methodology

As outlined in the Crime Plan, the UTSA research team analyzes the geographical occurrence of violent street crime[3] in Dallas approximately every 90 days to identify violent crime hot spots in the City where police resources should be focused. Areas of high activity (hereafter referred to as grids) were identified by an analysis of violent crime incidents from the previous three-month period throughout the City. During the most recent hot spot treatment (i.e., hereafter referred to as Period 4), 46 grids received one of several treatments designed to interrupt and reduce violent crime incidents in these locations. Eighteen grids received a high visibility treatment that involved placing patrol cars in grids with their emergency lights illuminated during peak crime times and days of the week, while 27 grids received an offender-focused treatment that involved targeting repeat and high-risk violent offenders by specialized, Division-based Crime Response Teams (CRTs). Additionally, three grids receiving the offender focused treatment also received a bike patrol treatment, which involved the deployment of multi-officer teams on bikes during selected days and times. Finally, stationary cameras were deployed in twelve grids (11 grids were receiving other types of treatments and one grid received the camera treatment only). These cameras were mounted on poles and provided real-time video to the Fusion Center on all activities within their scope.

Evaluation of Period 4 grids involved an analysis of violent crime incidents occurring in those grids during the pre-intervention period (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022) compared to those occurring during the post-intervention period (April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022). To assess potential changes in violent crime levels, average crimes per week were calculated for the pre-intervention and the post-intervention periods within the treated grids (N=45[4]), in catchment areas[5] surrounding the grids, and in all other grids (i.e., non-treatment or catchment). Additionally, arrests and calls for service to the police were also analyzed during the pre- and post-intervention periods.

Violent Crime

Table 4.1 summarizes the violent crime levels during the pre- and post-intervention periods. City-wide, the average number of violent crime incidents per week increased 27.8% during the Period

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[3] A "violent crime" is defined as any reported *incident* involving a murder/non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, or aggravated assault (not including family violence-related aggravated assaults) with at least one victim. Incidents with multiple offenses (e.g., a murder and a robbery) or multiple victims (three individuals assaulted) were counted as a single incident for the purposes of identifying hot spots and in the analyses reported below, unless otherwise noted.

[4] The single grid that received a camera treatment only was not included in the overall analysis, but it was analyzed in the camera specific treatment assessment. As a result, the overall analysis included 45 grids instead of all 46 grids.

[5] Catchment areas extend three grids outward in every direction from the treatment grids. In some areas, catchment areas overlap, and in a few areas the catchment area for a treatment grid contained another treated grid. Catchment areas allow for an assessment of possible crime displacement or diffusion of treatment benefits.

4 treatment when compared to the 13 weeks prior to the intervention. *Within the 45 treated grids, average violent crime incidents decreased 55% after the hot spot treatment was initiated.* Table 1 also provides evidence that crime in the offender focused (53%) and high visibility (57%) treatment areas decreased at similar rates. Finally, average violent crime incidents in the immediate areas surrounding the treated grids (i.e., catchment grids) increased 29% in the post-intervention period which mirrors the city-wide trend. Figure 4.5 below shows potential displacement effects by division, with some differences in this pattern across divisions. Given the results from the year-end differences-in-differences analysis reported above, it is important to keep in mind that a portion of the large absolute reductions in crime seen in the treated grids is likely the result of a 'regression to the mean' effect, or a natural decrease in the crime spike that precedes treatment in the targeted grids.

Table 4.1: Period 4 Violent Crime

	Pre-Intervention (Jan 1-Mar 31)		Post-Intervention (Apr 1-Jun 30)		Percent Change
	Total Incidents	*Ave. per week (N=13)*	*Total Incidents*	*Ave. per week (N=13)*	
City-Wide	1,510	116.2	1,930	148.5	27.8%
Non-Treatment/Catchment Grids	1,278	98.3	1,712	131.7	34.0%
Treatment Grids	97	7.5	44	3.4	-54.6%
Offender Focused Grids	60	4.6	28	2.2	-53.3%
High Visibility Grids	37	2.8	16	1.2	-56.8%
Catchment Grids	135	10.4	174	13.4	28.9%

Figure 4.1 presents this information in graph form and also details the large reductions in average violent crime incidents across all violent crime categories (i.e., murder, all robbery, robberies of individuals, robberies of businesses, and non-family violence aggravated assaults). These range from a 69% reduction in non-family violence aggravated assaults to a 25% reduction in murder incidents. Please note that some of these percentage changes reflect very few incidents and should be interpreted with caution.

Figure 4.1: Pre- and Post-Intervention Violent Crime

Figure 4.2 shows the longitudinal trends in weekly violent crime incidents using a more specific lens. The vertical red line represents the beginning of the Period 4 treatment within the 45 selected grids. The solid (and faint) lines represent the actual number of violent crime incidents within each week from January 1, 2022 (i.e., Week 1 of 2022) to June 30, 2022 (i.e., Week 26 of 2022). Most importantly, the dotted/dashed lines represent the four-week moving averages[6] of violent crime incidents across four key pieces of information:

1. Green line: violent crime incidents in the catchment areas surrounding the 45 treated grids
2. Dark blue line: violent crime incidents within the 45 treated grids. Based on the re-assessment of hot spots every 90 days, some treated grids may remain in the treatment group during the current 90-day period and thus can potentially skew the results in the current period. To provide a more accurate assessment of any potential treatment effect, the blue line (all 45 treated grids) was disaggregated into the purple (i.e., new treatment grids ONLY) and light blue (i.e., continuing treatment grids ONLY) lines.
3. Purple line: violent crime incidents in 34 grids that *were not* treated previously in Period 3

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[6] Moving averages assist in smoothing out week-to-week variation in activity and provide a more interpretable assessment of the trends occurring within the period of interest.

4.   Light blue line: violent crime incidents in 11 grids that *were* treated previously in Period 3

Figure 4.2 demonstrates that while levels of violent crime began falling in the pre-intervention period, the four-week moving average of violent crimes (dark blue) remained low within the first few weeks of treatment in Period 4 prior to a slight increase in Weeks 20-24, about two months after treatment began. Crime again declined in Weeks 25-26 at the end of the intervention period. These patterns were largely driven by crime incidents in newly treated grids (purple line). Note that the lines represent average crime incidents per week, and the number of incidents in treated grids hovered between 3-5 during treatment, which is well below the average pre-treatment levels in Weeks 1-11. Finally, the light blue line, representing previously treated grids, experienced post-treatment suppression and a further decrease beginning in Week 22. Recall that these grids (in light blue) were treated throughout the pre- and post-intervention period because they represent areas that consistently experienced higher than average levels of crime and thus were treated in Period 3 and throughout Period 4. Note the declining trend in violent crime (weeks 5-14) evident in the time series *before* the treatment went into effect. Again, this has been a consistent pattern in the treatment grid data from the inception of the hot spots strategy and appears to reflect a natural pattern of decline following large crime spikes in the grids prior to treatment.[7] Grids are chosen for treatment because they show patterns of increasing violence in the previous 90 days. Those spikes in violence naturally decay over time. The goal of the Period 4 hot spots treatment (and prior period treatments) is to further reduce violence in the treated grids and to maintain those crime suppression gains for as long as possible, even after treatment is removed.

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[7] In statistics, this phenomenon is known as regression to the mean and refers to naturally occurring patterns in time-series data whereby positive and negative "spikes" in the data series tend to level out over time.

Figure 4.2: Violent Crime Incidents in Treatment vs. Catchment Grids

Violent Crime Incidents (Jan 1-Jun 30):
Treatment vs. Catchment

y-axis: Treatment & Catchment Grids Crime
x-axis: Weeks

Legend:
- Intervention
- New Treatment Grids ONLY
- Catchment Grids
- 4 per. Mov. Avg. (New Treatment Grids ONLY)
- 4 per. Mov. Avg. (Catchment Grids)
- All Treatment Grids
- Continuing Treatment Grids ONLY
- 4 per. Mov. Avg. (All Treatment Grids)
- 4 per. Mov. Avg. (Continuing Treatment Grids ONLY)

Figure 4.3 shows the decreases in reported weekly averages of violent crime pre- and post-intervention by intervention type - high visibility grids compared to offender-focused grids. Across both the high visibility (light blue dashed line) and offender-focused (black dashed line) interventions, violent crime fell in the treated grids compared to crime incident levels at the beginning of the assessment period. While the reduction in average crime incident levels preceded the intervention for both treatment types, the high visibility grids experienced a consistent suppression until a slight uptick in crime incidents after Week 23. The offender-focused grids experienced low average crime incidents until an increase began to develop around Week 17. After peaking in Week 22, these grids declined substantially to conclude the evaluation period at a level lower than any other during the 26-week pre-post time series.

Figure 4.4 provides the same information as Figure 4.3 but focuses on the bike grids (N=5) and the camera grids (N=12). The bike teams were deployed in selected grids during Week 14 (red line) and the cameras were stationed in grids during Week 17 (red line). Bike team (black line) deployment contributed to a continued low level of average weekly crime incidents in the treated grids. Overall, there was a 30% reduction in post-intervention average weekly crime incidents within these grids; however, it is important to note that this assessment is based on measuring only three grids, and there were a limited number of incidents that contributed to the average change between the pre- and post-treatment measures.

Camera deployment as represented by the light blue dotted line reveals reductions in crime incidents in the weeks immediately following the introduction of the intervention, although Weeks 17-21 demonstrated an increase in average crime incidents in these locations. Thereafter, the camera grids began a noticeable decline throughout the remainder of the assessment period. Overall, the camera grids experienced a 39% reduction in average weekly crime incidents in the post-treatment period.

Figure 4.3: Treatment Intervention Types-High Visibility & Offender Focused

Figure 4.4: Treatment Intervention Types-Bike and Camera

Violent Crime Incidents (Jan 1-Jun 30): Treatment Type

Bike grids experienced a 30% reduction.
Camera grids experienced a 39% reduction.

Intervention-Bike   Intervention-Cameras   Bike Patrol
Cameras   4 per. Mov. Avg. (Bike Patrol)   4 per. Mov. Avg. (Cameras)

Figure 4.5 shows changes in average weekly violent crime incident counts within the seven patrol divisions *before and after* the hot spots strategy was implemented. Changes are shown division-wide, within non-treatment/catchment grids, treatment grids only, and catchment grids for each division. Note that these changes reflect the difference in average weekly crime incidents as opposed to percent change. For example, a value of -3 refers to the reduction of 3 average weekly crime incidents in the post-intervention period compared to the pre-intervention period.

Six of the seven divisions experienced a *reduction* (green bars) in average weekly crime incidents in the post-intervention period that ranged from -1.2 (North East) to -0.4 (Central). Only the South West Division experienced a slight increase in post-intervention average weekly crime incidents (+0.1), although these grids still had a smaller increase compared with crime in non-treated grids.

With respect to catchment areas, six of the seven divisions experienced a slight *increase* in post-intervention average weekly crime incidents that ranged from +1.4 (Central) to +0.1 (North East). The South East Division experienced a reduction of 0.5 average weekly crime incidents in the post-intervention period. Importantly, these increases in the catchment areas need to be considered in relation to the non-treatment/non-catchment grids in those divisions. Recall that no treatment was applied outside of the selected grids, including in the catchment areas; therefore, the level of crime in the catchment should be compared against other grids that did not receive treatment. There are two potential scenarios when conducting this comparison:

1. Displacement: When the average weekly crime incident level in the catchment area *exceeds* the non-treatment/non-catchment grids, this suggests that crime was rising faster in the areas around the treated grids (i.e., catchment grids) compared to the rest of the division.
2. Diffusion of Benefits: When the average weekly crime incident level in the catchment area *is equal to or below* the non-treatment/non-catchment grids, this suggests that crime was rising slower in the areas around the treated grids (i.e., catchment grids) compared to the rest of the division.

Of the six divisions with an increase in catchment grid crime levels, five of those divisions had lower catchment level crime compared to the non-treatment/non-catchment grids indicating a diffusion of benefits effect. In sum, while these catchment grids did not directly receive treatment, their level of crime increase was lower than all other non-treated grids. Only the North Central Division experienced a slight increase in catchment grid average weekly violent crime incidents in the post-intervention period (+0.3) while crime decreased in the rest of this division's grids. Thus, only North Central plausibly may have experienced slight crime displacement effects from the hot spot treatment.

Figure 4.5: Division-Percentage Change in Violent Crime

Average Crimes per Week Pre- and Post-Intervention (Jan 1-Jun 30): Division

■ Incident Difference Pre- vs. Post-Intervention

Arrest

Using NIBRS crime categories, arrest data were evaluated using four measures:

1. All arrests
2. Violent crime arrests (murder & nonnegligent manslaughter; robbery of individuals; robbery of businesses; and aggravated assault without family violence)
3. Violent Crime+ arrests (murder & nonnegligent manslaughter; robbery of individuals; robbery of businesses; aggravated assault without family violence; simple assault; and weapons violations)
4. Warrant arrests (all warrant arrests)

Figure 4.6 shows changes in the average number of weekly arrests city-wide and in treatment and non-treatment grids and by arrest type pre- and post- intervention. Post-period 4 intervention, total arrests increased 6.4% city-wide, but increased only 2.6% in the treatment grids. Importantly, the overall reduction in violent crime observed in the treatment grids during the intervention period (55%) was not coupled with an increase in overall arrest rates in those areas. There were some noticeable increases in violent crime arrests in non-treated areas (54%) and for violent crime+ arrests in treatment areas (32%). This latter increase was driven by increased arrests for simple assault and weapons violations in the treatment grids. Finally, warrant arrests fell by 30% in treatment grids, which contrasted with an increase in warrant arrests elsewhere (3%). This finding is contrary to the pattern seen in previous hot spots evaluation periods where warrant-based arrests typically *increased* in the treated grids and usually to a greater degree than in non-treated grids.

Figure 4.6: Pre- and Post-Intervention Arrests

Pre- and Post-Intervention (Jan 1 - Jun 30):
Average Arrests per Week

- Arrests Increase: % Change
- Arrests Decrease: % Change

All Arrests — City-Wide 6.4%, Non-Treat Grids 6.4%, Treatment Grids 2.6%

Violent Crime Arrests — City-Wide 51.1%, Non-Treat Grids 53.4%, Treatment Grids 0.0%

Violent Crime+ Arrests — City-Wide 11.0%, Non-Treat Grids 10.6%, Treatment Grids 32.4%

Warrant Arrests — City-Wide 2.4%, Non-Treat Grids 3.2%, Treatment Grids -30.4%

Calls for Service

The calls for service analyses reported below focused exclusively on violence-related calls for service[8] by the public. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.7 summarize these findings and demonstrate a roughly 23% increase in calls for service city-wide and a 21% reduction in treatment grids when comparing the pre- and post-intervention periods.

Table 4.2: Calls for Service Summary

	Pre-Intervention (Jan 1-Mar 31)		Post-Intervention (Apr 1-Apr 30)		Percent Change
	Total CFS	Ave. per week (N=13)	Total CFS	Ave. per week (N=13)	
City-Wide	7,937	610.5	9,738	749.1	22.7%
Non-Treatment Grids	7,834	602.6	9,657	742.8	23.3%
Treatment Grids	103	7.9	81	6.2	-21.4%

Figure 4.7: Pre- and Post-Intervention Calls for Service

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
[8] 14 - Stabbing, Cutting; 17 - Kidnapping in Progress; 19 – Shooting; 41/20 - Robbery - In Progress; 41/25 - Criminal Aslt -In Prog; 6G - Random Gun Fire; 6XE - Disturbance Emergency; 6XEA - Disturbance Emerg Amb; DAEF-Dist Armed Encounter Foot; DAEV-Dist Armed Encounter Veh; DASF-Dist Active Shooter Foot; DASV-Dist Active Shooter Veh.

5. Hot Spot Fidelity

This section of the report examines "fidelity" of the treatment plan or the extent to which the DPD deployed officers to the designated high visibility treatment grids during the appropriate days and times as identified by the hot spots analysis.[9] This assessment covers activity between May 2021 and June 2022. Our previous fidelity analysis (available in the Period 2 Hot Spot Analysis) revealed that officers marked out in the treatment grids during 60% to 70% of the expected days and times throughout Periods 1 and 2 based on DPD computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data.

During Period 3, DPD officers improved the fidelity rate to over 70% in all divisions with a high of 85.0% and a low of 71.9%. Overall, DPD achieved 78.99% fidelity according to CAD data in Period 3.[10] In Period 4, overall fidelity improved to 88.8%. There was some across-division variability as one division decreased to 67.7% fidelity while another division produced a 100% mark out rate.

Figure 5.1: Hot Spot Fidelity Rates for Periods 3 & 4

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
[9] All assessments were undertaken by DPD and the research team did not independently assess fidelity.

[10] Southwest Division was excluded from the Period 3 analysis because it had no high visibility treatment grids during the treatment period; similarly, North Central had only one high visibility grid in Period 3.

6. Place Network Investigations (PNI) Intervention

Background

The mid-term strategy from the Dallas Violent Crime Reduction Plan calls for the implementation of a place-based strategy to reduce violence and the underlying conditions that produce it within potential networks of violent places. Place Network Investigations (PNI) is a recently-developed strategy based in empirical scholarship and criminological theory that focus on the spatial distribution of crime in communities and the role of unguarded places used by individuals and criminal networks to facilitate crime. A PNI strategy is based on four empirical realities (Herold et al., 2020):

1. Crime is concentrated among a relatively small number of offenders, victims, and places
2. A small number of places account for most crime in any city
3. Law enforcement strategies that target criminal networks can reduce crime
4. Criminogenic places are networked

A PNI strategy begins with a problem-focused investigation of violence-prone locations to uncover the network of convergent settings (public places were offenders often meet), comfort spaces (private meeting locations used by individuals or groups to plan or facilitate crime), and corrupting spots (associated locations that encourage criminal activity) that make up the place network. Police use a variety of intelligence-driven efforts to uncover crime-place networks (traditional crime analysis, surveillance, informants, offender interviews, historical data) and then lead the development of a PNI Board made up of stakeholder government agencies (e.g., code enforcement, health departments, parks & recreation) and non-profit and/or community-based groups to design unique place-based strategies to address crime and its causes within the crime-place network. Traditional police enforcement efforts (arrests, controlled drug buys) are coupled with code enforcement, abatement, environmental design changes, disorder-focused efforts (graffiti abatement, trash clean up, abandoned vehicle removal, weed/brush removal) and other efforts to alter the criminogenic nature of the entire crime-place network (Herold, 2019).

A PNI strategy is intelligence-driven, requires the involvement and commitment of multiple stakeholders, and may involve the expenditure of money and other resources by city agencies and community-based organizations (CBOs). By focusing on the most violence-prone locations, though, PNI has the promise of significantly impacting violent crime, reducing victimization, and improving the quality of life in and around the affected locations.

The PNI Process in Dallas

By fall 2021, about four months after the near-term hot spot policing strategy went into effect, DPD was ready to begin the process of implementing PNI. Initially, DPD stood-up a small PNI

implementation team that consisted of a major, a sergeant, and two crime analysts who were tasked to work with the UTSA research team to evaluate potential pilot sites for PNI. The UTSA team analyzed three years of crime data and identified several sites that had been long-standing problem locations for violent crime. These locations consistently led the city in weekly violent crime counts over a three-year period and were well-known to the police.

After discussing options with the PNI team and DPD command staff, DPD settled on two locations to serve as pilot sites for PNI. One site was centered around a low-income apartment complex – the Volara Apartments – located at 3550 E. Overton Road in South Dallas and the other was a small strip shopping center at 11700 Ferguson Road in Northeast Dallas. The East Overton Road site, in particular, has been a centerpiece for violence in South Dallas for as long as any serving member of the DPD can remember. It has been the site of numerous murders, shootings, robberies, and aggravated domestic violence incidents for more than 30 years. The Ferguson Road site was chosen not only because it has been a hotbed for violent crime over the last several years but because it is a commercial location, which contrasts with the residential, multi-family apartment setting of 3550 E. Overton Road. DPD and the UTSA research team believed that the sites would provide opportunities for DPD to learn and work through the PNI process at a commercial site and within an apartment complex, which Dallas has many of and which disproportionately contribute to violent crime in the city.

Once the sites were agreed-upon, the UTSA team traveled to Dallas in early October and provided a day-long training session to the DPD PNI team and other internal DPD stakeholders, including officers from the DPD neighborhood police unit, gang unit, narcotics unit, nuisance abatement team, and others. This training focused on the concepts and theories behind PNI, problem-oriented policing, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and intelligence-led policing. It culminated with an afternoon PNI simulation exercise where small teams of DPD officers who attended the morning training sessions were provided with a realistic PNI scenario and tasked with applying the SARA model (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) to identify the data, analysis, linkages, and external partners that would be needed solve the place-based problems implicated in the scenario.

Following the October 2021 training, the DPD PNI team began a "work-up" of each PNI pilot location. They gathered historic crime and calls for service data at each site, combed DPD records for arrests, reported problems, and cases opened at each, and had discussions with internal DPD stakeholders (e.g., the gang and narcotics units) to help fill-in what was known about the problems and offenders associated with both sites. For example, in the case of the Volara Apartments, the PNI team learned that the Dallas city attorney's office previously filed a nuisance abatement case against the owners of the complex after multiple code violations went unaddressed but dismissed the case a year earlier after the complex made progress remediating the issues identified by the city.

By early December 2021, DPD had gathered enough preliminary information about each site that they felt ready to have the UTSA research team provide training on the PNI process to the various Dallas city department heads. These department heads were expected to form a PNI "board" to advise on place-based solutions and to commit the resources necessary to address the underlying conditions that had contributed to the persistent violence at the two pilot sites. On December 2, 2021, the UTSA team provided the department heads with a condensed version of the PNI training it had provided to the DPD PNI team in October. Table 6.1 below shows the initial conceptualization of the PNI board and the roles and responsibilities of the various Dallas city departments in the place-based strategy:

Table 6.1 Initial PNI Board Membership and Responsibilities

City Department	Roles and Responsibilities
Police	- Lead PNI board - Gather intelligence - Conduct criminal investigations - Make arrests - Deter criminal activity - Analyze crime and public-safety related data
Building Inspection	Address safety issues identified in buildings
City Attorney/Community Prosecution	- Legal review of abatement/intervention strategies - Prosecution of code and related violations
Code Enforcement	- Address code violations - Issue citations
Fire Inspection	Identify/address fire hazards and fire code violations
Housing and Neighborhood Revitalization	Repair/abate housing-related deficiencies
Risk Management	Review and provide input on risk mitigation strategies associated with interventions
Parks & Recreation	- Address design or re-development of parks as needed - Repair or remove dilapidated equipment or structures
Planning & Urban Design	- Assess infrastructure changes to reduce opportunity for crime - Crime prevention through environmental design
Public Works	Assess transportation-related matters, including street repairs, re-design, or construction
Transportation	Evaluate traffic management, signs, signals, or safety issues related to sites

Zoning	• Review applicable zoning regulations and recommend/implement changes as needed
Sanitation	• Clear and remove trash and debris
Dallas City Marshall	• Illegal dumping
Dallas Animal Services	• Address animal-related violations
Office of Homeless Solutions	• Address homelessness and related public safety and quality of life issues in target areas
Sustainable Development	• Suggest, plan, and implement sustainable development solutions
311	• Public information campaigns in targeted areas to encourage community response

Between December 2021 and the end of January 2022, the DPD PNI team began defining place-based problems and developing possible solutions at each of the pilot sites based on the data it had collected. At a January 26th meeting at DPD headquarters, they presented their work for feedback and discussion with internal DPD stakeholders (operational technology, CAPERS, intelligence units; gang unit; CRT teams; Fusion Center/RTCC; nuisance abatement; vice) and the UTSA research team. By then, the DPD team had identified a robust set of problems and solutions at each location and was in the process of obtaining commitments for necessary resources from the impacted city departments and DPD units.

Two days later, on January 28th, DPD convened a meeting of PNI board members and other external stakeholders, including:
- Code Compliance
- ACT for Justice
- Child Poverty Action Lab
- Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions (OIPSS)
- City Attorney's Office

At that meeting, DPD again presented the results of its data and intelligence gathering on the two sites and sought feedback from those in attendance.

Following these two meetings, the UTSA team made a number of detailed suggestions for how to clarify problems and solutions, sharpen lines of responsibility, and most importantly, develop clear and achievable metrics to assess the implementation and impact of each proposed solution. The goal was to identify one or more quantitative measures for each problem/solution that would enable the DPD and outside stakeholders to evaluate (1) whether the solution was implemented as intended, and (2) whether it was effective based on the overarching violence reduction goals of the Crime Plan.

As the DPD PNI team was working with the UTSA research team in February and March 2022 to identify and define appropriate metrics for success, the operational components of the site-specific

plans began to slowly roll out beginning February 9, 2022. By mid-April 2022, full operations plans were in place for each site. They are reproduced in the Appendix and summarized below in the sections on PNI Implementation and Impact.

The operations plans identify problems (multiple at each site), proposed solutions, responsible parties, timelines, action steps, and measures of implementation and impact. They also contain maps of each site, which include associated properties that field intelligence suggested were part of the crime-place "network" at each location. At the Ferguson Road location, the original strip center itself located at 11740 Ferguson Road is included in the site plan, but also included are a nearby Texaco gas station and several apartment complexes behind the commercial establishments that DPD intelligence suggested were "feeders" (supplying suspected offenders and victims) to the violence occurring at the strip center. Similarly, the site plan for 3550 E. Overton Road also included a nearby strip center at 4800 Sunnyvale Road suspected of being a "convergent setting" for the violence associated with the Volara Apartments.

PNI Implementation

As previously noted, PNI went "live" on February 9, 2022, and efforts slowly ramped up at the sites over several months during the spring of 2022. This evaluation of PNI covers the period from implementation (Feb 9, 2022) through June 30, 2022. Once finalized, the operations plans for the pilot sites served as guides for the DPD and UTSA teams to track problems at each site, view roles and responsibilities at a glance, and eventually assess implementation and impact. Working from the operations plans, the UTSA team created a data collection spreadsheet that the DPD PNI sergeant used to organize and report information on the problems identified at each site and their associated process metrics. This data collection spreadsheet serves as one of the primary data sources for the implementation evaluation that follows.

Tables 6.2-6.3 provide a summary of the identified problems, solutions, and implementation metrics at each site, as well as a color-coded indicator (final column) showing the status of each problem/solution. Red cells indicate little or no progress toward implementing the proposed solution, yellow cells indicate partial implementation, and green cells indicate substantial progress toward implementation based on the indicated process measures.

Table 6.2 PNI Implementation at Ferguson Road Site

Problem	Solutions	Process Measurement	Status
Lack of Inclusion to abate crime in Business	The NPO unit will establish safety coalition meetings for businesses and apartment communities in the immediate area	1. Number of safety coalition meetings conducted per month 2. Attendance at each	1. One community engagement event held; One meeting with apartment management 2. 70 attendees at community event; 25 persons (including apt security) at management meeting
Lack of Security at Businesses	The NPO unit will address security concerns with the property owners and management and work with them to improve their businesses	Security plan implemented	Security assessments conducted; Working cameras and/or security personnel at some businesses but not others; **Site-specific security plans not developed or implemented**
Homelessness	The Office of Homeless Solutions will perform sweeps through the area and attempt to find housing and shelter for the homeless population	1. Count of homeless at location monthly 2. Count of how many accept services 3. Number of calls for service regarding homeless activity	1. NPOs working with Code Enforcement and Office of Homeless Solutions (OHS) to resolve homeless camp/problems 2. Homeless count requested from OHS (May) No data provided
Blight – streets, sidewalk repair/lighting/trash	The Department of Urban Development and Neighborhood Revitalization and OIPSS can provide solutions to aid in the revitalization of this neighborhood	Development and implementation of SMART blight abatement plan	No data provided

Problem	Solutions	Process Measurement	Status			
Narcotics/Gang Problems	1. Narcotics and Gang unit investigations will continue to identify and dismantle criminal networks located within the location. They will also identify locations for covert cameras to aid in intel.	1. Unit activities in the area, including open investigations & arrests	1. Multiple arrests/drug seizures made; Search warrant/arrest made at 11760 Ferguson (June)			
	2. Federal agencies will be notified by the Gang Unit and Narcotics if a network is uncovered that may qualify for federal assistance.	2. Number of cases filed or referred for federal prosecution	2. No data provided			
Violent Crime	1. Re-assigned grid to offender-used	1. CRT activities in the area, including investigations, stops, etc.	1. CRT unit and Bike Team deployed and active; Multiple stops/arrests/stolen vehicles recovered			
	2. OIPSS can coordinate with other city departments to create equitable policies		2. No data provided			
	3. Improved intel to RTCC	2. Development and implementation of SMART crime abatement plan				
	4. Bike unit – abate crime with visual presence; develop rapport with residents and management; develop and share intel	3. Number of reports or other intelligence-sharing communications with DPD units operating in the area and RTCC	3. Single report by NPOs of possible apartments involved in violent crime			
		4. Cases referred to narcotics & gang unit; intel shared	4. Two gang cards issued			

Problem	Solutions	Process Measurement	Status
Code Violations at Convenience Stores	Code enforcement will complete compliance checks at the convenience stores, address violations with the management and owners, and monitor for compliance.	Monthly count of documented violations	Code enforcement toured properties; Inspection completed; Store failed; Unresolved issues remain
11760 Ferguson Risk Property Qualification	Nuisance Abatement Unit and City Attorney's Office will assess and determine if a risk case will be opened and actions taken on the property	Gain management and owner's cooperation with reducing the amount of abatable crimes at the location	DPD personnel referred apartment complex to City Attorney; Case denied after property owners found to be cooperating with Bike Team to address problems

Table 6.3: PNI Implementation at East Overton Road Site

Problem	Solutions	Process Measurement	Status
Tension between residents and management	1. Office of Community Care can provide resources to both groups. 2. NPO unit will establish a group not just for the apartments, but for the neighborhood as a whole. This safety coalition will have regular meetings and establish a rapport with the community and our city.	Number of management/resident meetings and number in attendance	Crime watch meetings held in March and May – 8 total attendees; Violence workshop scheduled
Family Violence	1. DPD has begun a program to send police officers out with social workers to high-risk family violence victims in an effort to provide resources to victims. 2. OIPSS has a team of violence interrupters that are able to reach out	1. Number of residents in attendance at family violence workshops/violence interrupter workshops. 2. Contacts by violence interrupters with community members	1. DV workshop rescheduled for 7/27 (Family Place, DV survivors, CPS presentation) 2. No data provided

	to community members and provide resources to the location		
Crime inducing environment	DPD to revamp Gold Star Program in partnership with the Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions and the City Attorney's Office.	Trainings of management and residents .	OIPSS met with management ahead of July 4th weekend; Discussed various security concerns (inoperable gates, security guards); New camera system on order; Management has been cited twice by Dallas Fire for inoperable gates; Management committed to hire on-site security
CPTED analysis	Code Compliance will be requested to complete a CPTED analysis for this property and provide those results, feedback, and suggestions to the group for implementation	How many aspects of the CPTED analysis have been complied with or implemented.	Miscommunication on responsibility for CPTED analysis; Not complete but scheduled
Gangs/violent crime	1. Ongoing operations by DPD gang unit to target and dismantle active gangs in the area	1. Gang unit activity; hours worked; gang members identified	1. Federal investigation ongoing; two gang cards issued
	2. CRT operating in the area (offender-focus	2. CRT mark-outs; cases made	2. CRT Unit active throughout evaluation period; Multiple arrests made, weapons seized; Many CRT mark outs reported
	3. Intelligence sharing with RTCC	3. Number of reports or other intelligence-sharing communications with DPD units	3. Real Time Crime Center monitoring cameras on-site; Stolen vehicles observed; Info passed to officers who attempted stop, driver fled

	4. DPD will seek federal assistance where it can be utilized to develop strong cases for individuals responsible for crime in this community	4. Number of cases filed or referred for federal prosecution	4. One federal warrant presented
	5. Bike Unit – abate crime with a visual presence, develop rapport with apartment community members, develop intel regarding the surrounding location	5. Cases referred to narcotics & gang unit; networks dismantled	5. No data reported
Narcotics	Narcotics will be provided with all intel information gained from this location and will assess which intel is workable intel for their unit	Narcotics unit activity, hours worked; gang members identified	Narcotics has opened a case at location; Warrant being worked at nearby location; No further data reported
Code Violations	Code Enforcement will monitor locations for violations and meet with management to get those rectified in a timely manner	Voluntary compliance with Code requirements and/or citations written/documented	In April, OIPSS coordinated intensive inspections with Code Compliance and DPD; More than 150 issues were documented and brought to the attention of the apartment managers; OIPSS now has an office on-site at the Volara Apartments
City Attorney's Office/Nuisance Abatement	The City Attorney's Office will continue to monitor this location for a potential Risk case and seek compliance from the management and owners of the location to help abate crime	Voluntary compliance and/or nuisances offenses documented	New owner recently purchased the apartments; Improvements are being made; Risk evaluation is on hold
Enforce lease violations	The DPD Nuisance Abatement Unit and City Attorney's Office develop a plan and urge the apartment management to enforce their lease requirements. Revamp and implement the Gold Star Program	Compliance with Injunction and enforcement of lease violations	Management agreed to share background screening process with OIPSS; 71 evictions were filed; Evictions were placed on hold following the efforts of a local non-profit

	with assistance from the Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions		
Abandoned Vehicle Removal	Code enforcement to look at all code violations to include inoperable vehicles or abandoned vehicles left on property	1. Gates working properly, code violations rectified, and abandoned vehicles removed	1. Gates still not working
		2. Decrease in the number of abandoned vehicles on-site	2. Abandoned vehicles given notice; No data on numbers being towed
Loitering	Consider a city ordinance to require all apartment communities to have green space and adequate play structures for children and adults and limit concentrations of apartments in one area	Number of citations/warnings/removals for loitering	No data
Ineffective management	1. City Attorney's Office to utilize receiverships for complexes that refuse to cooperate and do not help in the crime abatement. 2. The Housing and Neighborhood Revitalization can assist management and the community in building a stronger, fair housing community	1. Was an injunction or receivership sought? Granted? Denied	1. New ownership; Risk case on hold; Management is cooperating
		2. Surveys at the location to determine tenant satisfaction	2. Resident survey conducted by DPD on 12/9/21; Follow-up planned for comparison purposes in summer 2022

The first two PNI locations were conceptualized as pilot sites from the beginning of the process. DPD and the UTSA research team recognized there would be a steep learning curve for all stakeholders involved, both internally and externally, and that lessons would be learned that could be applied to future PNI sites. As the implementation tables above show, much effort has been expended by DPD, OIPSS, and other stakeholders to help improve the conditions at both sites. DPD division-based Crime Response Teams (CRTs) and Crime Plan Bike Team officers have been active at both sites since the operations plans came together in the first quarter of 2022. They have been a constant presence at the sites gathering intelligence, making cases and arrests, and attempting to suppress criminal activity. For the first two quarters of 2022, Bike Team officers have been assigned to the PNI sites, as well as other high-crime grids, to be visible in the community and to gather intelligence. Although they make arrests when necessary, their primary role is to be visible and to gather intelligence that can be used by the CRTs and other specialized units (e.g. Investigators; Gang and Narcotics units) to make cases against gang members and other known or suspected violent offenders engaged in criminal activity.

At the same time, DPD neighborhood police officers (NPOs) have been active at both locations working with business owners, apartment managers, and residents on issues involving safety and quality of life. They have coordinated some lightly attended crime watch meetings and are working on scheduling a domestic violence workshop at the Volara Apartments in July. OIPSS has been a great resource and active partner with DPD on similar issues. They now have an office on-site at the 3550 E. Overton Road location (Volara Apartments) and are working with the new owners and property managers to remediate the numerous health and safety code violations that Code Compliance has identified. At the Ferguson Road site, homelessness remains an unresolved problem. There is a large homeless encampment in the area that has not been addressed, and no data were reported on the homeless-related implementation metrics (counts of homeless population and those accepting services) identified in the operations plan for the site.

Internally, DPD has recently added personnel to help better staff the implementation of the Crime Plan, including PNI. A new DPD major, lieutenant, sergeant, and senior corporal have been added to the team. In May 2022, DPD Sergeant Breanna Valentine and the UTSA research team attended a national PNI conference convened by Dr. Robin Engel in Denver. Dr. Smith spoke at the conference and fielded numerous questions and inquiries about the Dallas model and Crime Plan from law enforcement agency representatives across the nation.

One of the lessons learned from the conference was the need to gather better intelligence on the underlying place networks associated with high crime places. In the first iteration of PNI in Dallas, the PNI team was unable to clearly map the flow of offenders and criminal behavior across places/addresses/apartments at the two sites. Insufficient covert surveillance at the outset hampered the team's ability to truly map or understand the extent to which offenders were making use of nearby "convergent settings," "comfort spaces," or "corrupting spots" to facilitate their

activities at the PNI sites. The new personnel recently added to the DPD PNI team have allowed for greater intelligence gathering and the development of new gang/narcotics cases, some of which have already been accepted for federal prosecution. The identification of future PNI sites will include an intensive effort to uncover the use by offenders of place networks to facilitate their illicit activities, and responses/solutions will be designed to address the entire network of criminogenic places that make up the next PNI site(s).

While much place-based work been accomplished at both sites since February, gaps remain in meeting the initial implementation goals set forth in the operations plans. The red and yellow cells highlighted above in the implementation tables indicate where additional efforts are still needed. Internal discussions also point to the need to be more careful about how problems are defined in the future and whether some of the measures (e.g., documented gang activity) are valid indicators of success. From a data collection standpoint, better cooperation is needed from some DPD units in reporting data and activities to the PNI coordinating sergeant. Additional detail on dates, times, size, and scope of some activities also is needed to help the UTSA team better assess the fidelity of the PNI plan and its implementation metrics. Again, these are lessons learned from the first two pilot sites and will be incorporated into future planning for additional PNI sites, which is anticipated to begin in fall 2022

PNI Impact

The operations plans for both PNI sites align expected impact metrics with the various problems identified at each location. These impact metrics include the following:

11700 Ferguson Road

- Reduction in the number of reported violent offenses and victims of violent crime
- Reduction in homelessness-related calls for service
- Fewer arrests of homeless individuals for crimes of violence
- Decrease in drug sales and drug-related violent crimes
- Reduction in gang-related violent crime
- Reduction in documented gang members operating in the area

3550 E. Overton Road

- Decrease in family violence offenses and victims
- Reduction in non-family violent crimes and victims
- Reduction in gang-related violent crime and victimization
- Decrease in drug sales and drug-related violent crimes
- Fewer calls for service related to loitering or suspicious activity

Complicating an analysis of PNI-related impacts is the fact that both PNI locations contained high crime grids that were treated as part of the near-term hot spots policing strategy that began in May 2021. In the case of 3550 E. Overton Road, an associated grid received offender-focused hot spot treatments in each of the four 90-day treatment periods (May 2021-June 2022), and both PNI sites were assigned to additional bike team coverage beginning in February 2022. In addition, both sites received DPD pole cameras beginning in April 2022. Consequently, both sites received additional police attention via the hot spots strategy prior to and during the PNI implementation period that is the subject of this evaluation (Feb 9-June 30, 2022).

With those caveats in mind, the UTSA research team obtained relevant pre-post PNI implementation crime, calls for service, and arrest data from the DPD for the two PNI sites. These data were geographically bounded according to the site maps contained in the site-specific operations plans for each location. These maps show how the DPD spatially defined the PNI sites at the outset of strategy. The Ferguson Road site includes the strip shopping center that was the original focal point for violent crime in the area, but it also includes the adjacent Texaco station and a large grouping of apartments (Meadows at Ferguson) that stretches southeast of the strip center for almost a mile.

Similarly, the East Overton Road site begins with the Volara Apartments, but it includes a polygon approximately 2 miles across that incorporates a strip center suspected to be a "convergent setting" associated with the apartment complex. In reality, though, police and related public safety efforts associated with the 3550 E. Overton Road site were focused exclusively on the Volara apartments, which sit on the northern boundary of the much larger PNI site map for that location (see Appendix). For this reason, the impact results shown below for this PNI site focus only on the Volara Apartments themselves.

Temporally, the data used for this impact evaluation run from September 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022. Using February 9, 2022 as the PNI start date, we evaluate five months of crime and calls for service data pre-implementation and five months of data post-implementation. Our analytic strategy compares relevant weekly crime, arrest, and calls for service counts (based on
the metrics shown above for each site) at each location in the five months leading up to the launch of PNI to the five-month period (Feb-June 2022) after PNI began. In essence, this analytic approach attempts to control for the influence of the hot spots strategy at the PNI sites as a fixed effect while measuring change associated with the additional PNI measures undertaken at the sites by the DPD and other stakeholders.

Impact Analyses

Table 6.4 below provides a month-by-month breakdown of reported violent incidents and victimization at the Ferguson Road site. Offenses and victims are broken down by total, non-family violence-related, and family violence-involved incidents/victims. By most measures, violent crime

increased at this location after the PNI strategy was put in place in February 2022. Total violent incidents increased from 24 to 32 (33%) while the number of victims increased from 30 to 37 (23%). Homeless-related calls for service increased from 15 to 19 pre-post implementation, while homeless-related arrests decreased slightly. Drug-related sales and arrests *decreased* by two thirds. However, data for homeless-related arrests and drug-related crime are not systematically collected by the DPD in its RMS system and should be interpreted with caution. Unless improvements are made to how these data are captured, future PNI evaluations will not include these metrics.

Table 6.4: PNI Site - Ferguson Rd.

	Sep-21	Oct-21	Nov-21	Dec-21	Jan-22	Feb-22	Mar-22	Apr-22	May-22	Jun-22	Total Pre-Int.	Total Post-Int.	Mo. Pre-Int	Mo. Post-Int	Mo. Diff.
All Violent Incidents (VI)	3	8	4	3	6	6	6	6	9	5	24	32	4.8	6.4–1.6	
VI - No Family Violence (FV)	2	5	2	3	3	4	4	4	7	4	15	23	3.0	4.6–1.6	
VI - FV	1	3	2	0	3	2	2	2	2	1	9	9	1.8	1.8	0.0
–Victims - FV	2	3	2	0	3	2	2	2	2	1	10	9	2.0	1.8	-0.2
Homeless CFS	2	3	8	1	1	4	3	2	3	7	15	19	3.0	3.8	0.8
Homeless Arrests	4	1	1	2	4	6	1	2	0	2	12	11	2.3	2.2	-0.1
Drug Sales & Drug-related Violent Crimes	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	1	6	2	0.6	0.4	-0.2

Based on VCRP: Ferguson-Woodmeadow

Homeless arrests based on Beats 227 & 228

No information was provided on gang-related activity at this location

Figure 6.1 below provides a visual representation of the violent crime data reported in Table 6.4. Violent incidents (red line) and victimization (gold line) held steady in the two months leading up the intervention and then remained flat for several months before spiking in May and then decreasing in June. The May 2022 increase also tracks with an overall increase in violence experienced in Dallas during the spring. Family violence (green line) was largely unchanged pre-post implementation.

Figure 6.1: PNI Site - Ferguson Rd., Violent Crime

PNI - Ferguson Rd.:
Violent Crime & Victims, Sep 2021 - June 2022

Figure 6.2 tracks homeless -related arrests (purple line), calls for service (green line), and drug-related sales and violent crime (red line) at the Ferguson Road PNI site. Of these three measures, only homeless-related calls for service are systematically collected, and they showed an *increase* over pre-intervention monthly counts.

Figure 6.2: PNI Site - Ferguson Rd., Homeless & Drug-related Activity

PNI - Ferguson Rd.:
Homeless & Drug-related Activity, Sep 2021 - June 2022

Legend:
- Intervention
- Homeless CFS
- Homeless Arrests (based on Beat 227, 228)
- Drug Sales & Drug-related Violent Crimes

Similar to Table 6.1, Table 6.5 provides a summary of violent crime at the 3550 E. Overton Road site before and after the PNI intervention began in February 2022. Again, these data were derived from the Volara Apartments, which received the PNI treatment described above. Total recorded violent incidents fell from 10 to 6 (-40%) after the intervention began, while even steeper reductions were seen in the number of victims of violent crime (-60%). Crime reductions were seen across all categories of family and non-family violence incidents and victims post-intervention. These findings are also reflected in the ongoing hot spots treatment strategy. For the first time since the Crime Plan began in May 2021, the primary grid associated with the Volara Apartments is no longer a spot. As with the Ferguson Road data, drug-related fields are not systematically captured in the RMS, so the drug sales and drug-related violent crime counts in Table 2 (last row) are likely inaccurate and probably undercount the incidence of these crimes.

**Table 6.5: PNI Site - Overton Rd.**

	Sep-21	Oct-21	Nov-21	Dec-21	Jan-22	Feb-22	Mar-22	Apr-22	May-22	Jun-22	Total Pre-Int.	Total Post-Int.	Mo. Pre-Int	Mo. Post-Int	Mo. Diff.
All Violent Incidents (VI)	1	3	5	0	1	2	2	1	0	1	10	6	2.0	1.2	−0.8
VI - No Family Violence (FV)	1	1	5	0	1	2	2	1	0	0	8	5	1.6	1.0	−0.6
VI - FV	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0.4	0.2	-0.2
Victims - FV	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0.4	0.2	-0.2
Drug Sales & Violent Crimes Incidents	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	2	0.4	0.4	0.0

Based on Grid IDs: 29874, 29875, 29876, 30192, 30193, 30194, 30509, 30510, 30511, 30512, 30826, 30827, 30828, 30829, 31147, 31148, 31149. Only grids 30511 & 30826 contained data.
No Gang-related Violent Crime or Calls for Service (Loitering/Suspicious Activity) related to these specific grids.

Figure 6.3 below provides a visual representation of the data from Table 6.5. All categories of crime fell in the months following the intervention compared to pre-intervention averages.

Figure 6.3: PNI Site - Overton Rd., Violent Crime

PNI - Overton Rd.:
Violent Crime & Victims, Sep 2021 - June 2022

Legend:
- Intervention
- All Violent Incidents
- Violent Incidents - Family Violence
- All Victims
- Victims - Family Violence

Finally, Figure 6.4 shows the levels of drug-related activity at this PNI site with the caveat that these data are likely undercounts of actual drug sales and drug-related violent crime incidents.

Figure 6.4: PNI Site - Overton Rd., Drug-related Activity

Discussion of Impact

The impact of the PNI strategy on crime at the 11700 Ferguson Road and 3550 E. Overton Road sites is difficult to assess because both sites also were being treated with hot spots deployment and cameras during all or portions of this initial PNI evaluation period (Feb-Jun 2022). With that caveat in mind, violent crime increased somewhat at the Ferguson Road location and decreased significantly at the Overton Road site during the intervention. What might explain these differences?

The treatment area at Ferguson Road was quite large and incorporated an entire VCRP area. While the initial focal point of the strategy was the strip shopping center at 11740 Ferguson Road, the treatment area also incorporated a large number of apartments that extend for more than a mile along Woodmeadow Parkway southeast from its intersection with Ferguson Road. At the East Overton Road location, by contrast, police and other public safety efforts (e.g., code enforcement) were concentrated solely on single apartment complex (Volara Apartments) that had long been a hot bed for violence in South Dallas. Thus, the intensity of PNI-related efforts was significantly greater at the East Overton Road site while the Ferguson Road efforts were more diffuse and covered a much larger geographic area.

Furthermore, while deep intelligence gathering and mapping of crime-place networks did not occur at either location, the East Overton Road site was well-understood to be focused on the Volara Apartments. The Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions opened an office in one of the apartments onsite, and DPD bike teams and NPOs were able to concentrate their efforts on a single complex. The Ferguson Road site was larger, involved apartments and commercial businesses, and did not receive the same intensity of activity as occurred at the East Overton Road site, primarily because the site is so much larger. Moreover, the DPD Northeast Patrol Division where the Ferguson Road site is located has been a challenging division from a violent crime standpoint throughout the first and second quarters of 2022. In the first quarter of 2022, it was one of only two divisions to see an overall increase in violent crime, and crime again increased slightly in the division during the second quarter. Despite the challenges, a broad range of city agencies has devoted significant resources to the PNI efforts at Ferguson Road, and DPD will continue to work in close partnership with them on this and other future PNI sites.

In the meantime, and in response the challenges at Ferguson Road, the DPD added personnel to its PNI team and worked with its federal partners to extend the federal Project Safe Neighborhoods area in North East Dallas to include the Ferguson Road PNI site. In recent weeks, DPD personnel have made several significant cases against suspected gang members in the area, and the U.S. Attorney's Office has agreed to prosecute them in federal court. The DPD has stepped up its enforcement efforts at the Ferguson Road site while continuing its focus on keeping 3550 E. Overton Road off the hot spots list of the most violent places in Dallas.

DPD efforts to implement the PNI strategy at the these first two locations should be viewed as a learning experience. The initial small DPD PNI team did an excellent job of identifying problems that may have been contributing to violent crime at both sites, but they never conducted surveillance or developed the intelligence necessary to map the underlying criminal networks at either site. Nonetheless, their efforts and those of other city stakeholders have reduced the occurrence of problems at the strip center on Ferguson Road and lowered the level of violence at 3550 E. Overton Road to the point that it is not currently a hot spot. Valuable lessons have been learned along the way that will brought be to bear in the selection and treatment of the next set of PNI sites, which hopefully will begin to take shape in fall 2022.

7. Conclusion

Sections 2-6 summarized the results of the implementation and impact analyses of the hot spots and PNI strategies undertaken over the past 13 months (May 2021-June 2022). Based on these analyses, the execution of the Crime Plan by the Dallas Police Department has reduced violent crime in the City of Dallas and in specifically targeted areas. As demonstrated throughout this report, the empirical effectiveness of the Crime Plan, coupled with other efforts to address violence in the City, has resulted in a safer city in the past year compared to previous years.

The reduction in violent crime is a direct result of the hard work of the men and women of the Dallas Police Department, Department leadership, and the support of their efforts by the citizens, communities, government leaders, and other stakeholders in the City of Dallas. While these gains cannot be solely attributed to the Crime Plan, it is clear that the collective efforts of the aforementioned groups in adopting, supporting, and implementing the Crime Plan is having a demonstrable effect on reducing violent crime. This section provides a brief summary of the empirical evidence demonstrating the reduction in violent crime in the City of Dallas.

Year to Year Comparison

The year-to-year analyses compared the city-wide levels of violent crime in the Crime Plan year (May 2021-May 2022) to the previous two years and demonstrated:
- An upward trend in violent crime in the three years (2018-2020) leading up to the Crime Plan year was reversed and Part 1 violent crime fell about 6% during the Crime Plan year compared to the year before
- The city-wide level of violent street crime was 11.5% lower in the Crime Plan year compared to the May 2020-May 2021 period
- The city-wide level of violent crime was 18% lower in the Crime Plan year compared to the May 2019-May 2020 period
- A second analysis also compared violent crime subtypes in the Crime Plan year to the previous year.
    - City-wide murders were 13% lower during the Crime Plan year compared to the previous year
    - City-wide robberies were reduced 21% (individual robberies) and 17% (business robberies) during the Crime Plan year compared to the May 2020-May 2021 period
    - Aggravated assaults (non-family violence) were reduced 5% in the Crime Plan year compared to the previous 12 months.
    - The number of victims of violent crime decreased by 8% in the Crime Plan year compared to the June 2020-May 2021 period.

Temporal Assessment of Crime in Grids

Given the significant focus on hot spots during the initial year of the Crime Plan, three different analyses were conducted to assess the specific impact of the Plan on treated grids. First, data from July 2020-June 2022 were analyzed by month with the following results:

- In treatment grids, the monthly average of violent crime incidents in treatment grids dropped between 33-41% when compared to the pre-treatment monthly averages
- Once treatment was discontinued, the treated grids continued to experience noticeable reductions in monthly crime compared to the pre-treatment period (between 27-40%)
- In catchment grids (those in the immediate geographic proximity to the treated grids), there was evidence of diffusion of benefits as the monthly average of violent crimes moved from 54.5 in the pre-treatment period to 52.3 during treatment

A second analysis of violent crime in the grids involved assessing the portion of city-wide violent crime contributed by the treated grids.

- In the 10 months prior to treatment, the grids selected for treatment accounted for approximately 5% of city-wide violent crime
- Once treatment was applied (across four periods), the contribution of violent crime in grids accounted for between 2 and 3% of city-wide crime
- Thus, by only treating approximately 115 of the roughly 101,000 grids across the city, the percentage of crime city-wide contributed by those grids was reduced by more than 40%.

Importantly, a limitation to comparing pre- and post-treatment changes (see above and in previous Period reports) is that peak crime periods in high crime locations may return to a lower level of crime regardless of intervention. Indeed, weekly or monthly graphs of treatment application reveal that crime began to fall in many of the treated grids *prior to* the treatment. To address this issue, a third analysis was conducted to assess the impact of the hot spots treatment on violent crime in the treated grids while controlling for the earlier spikes in crime that were used to select the grids for treatment in the first place. Difference-in-differences statistical models were used to estimate the percentage of crime reduction in the treated grids that was attributable to the treatment.

- Results showed that treatment grids averaged a 10.7% reduction in violent crime incidents during treatment
- Analysis for spillover effects revealed that crime fell slightly (0.4% on average) in catchment area grids, confirming that these areas benefited from the treatment and did not experience crime displacement on average.

Period 4 Treatment Evaluation

Specific analyses of the 46 grids treated in Period 4 (April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022) also was conducted. Results revealed the following:

- Violent crime fell 54.6% in treated grids when compared to pre-treatment weekly averages

- These crime reductions were seen across all violent crimes analyzed and all treatment strategies and were found in all divisions
- Outside of the treatment grids, violent crime increased 34% in non-treatment/catchment grids when comparing pre- and post-treatment weekly averages
- While violent crime increased 28.9% in catchment grids during the treatment period, this increase was about 5% *less* than in non-catchment grids and provides evidence that the surrounding catchment grids benefited from the treatment
- The number of arrests in treatment grids trailed the overall city-wide arrests levels, and warrant arrests in the treated grids declined in the post-intervention period
- Calls for service were higher throughout the city but decreased in the treatment grids.

Hot Spot Fidelity

Fidelity refers to the extent to which the DPD deployed officers to the designated high visibility treatment grids during the appropriate days and times as identified by the hot spots analysis. The data for these analyses were drawn from the DPD Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. These analyses were conducted for Periods 3 & 4 at the division level; results from Periods 1 & 2 can be found in the Period 2 Report.
- In Period 3, the overall fidelity rate was 79% across all divisions
- In Period 4, the overall fidelity rate improved to 89% across all divisions

Place Network Investigations (PNI) Intervention

The PNI planning process began in Fall 2021 with the development of a DPD team devoted to this effort. They and the UTSA researcher team analyzed several years of violent crime data to identify pilot PNI locations. This process also included the development of a PNI Board and working group comprised of DPD members and other city stakeholders. Training of relevant personnel, the development of site-specific operations plans to address identified problems, and the creation of a data collection strategy for measuring implementation and impact took place in fall 2021. Implementation across two pilot sites began in February 2022. Key findings from the initial analysis of the two PNI pilot sites include the following:
- Assessment of the implementation efforts revealed some gaps that need to be addressed, including lack of data on some specific metrics, the challenges of coordinating a multi-agency effort, and a lack of experience with this type of strategy. Improvements are evident as experience and cooperation between agencies/stakeholders develops.
- A comprehensive outcome evaluation for the two pilot sites is somewhat premature as PNI related activity has only intensified in the past couple of months
- To date, metrics (i.e., crime, victims, arrest, and calls for service) do not reveal a quantitative violent crime reduction impact at the Ferguson Rd. location. A substantial crime reduction effect was documented at the Overton Rd. site pre vs. post-PNI implementation.

- While great effort and progress have been made toward executing the mid-term strategy, considerable work is still needed to reach the strategy's potential to reduce and disrupt violent crime at these locations, particularly the Ferguson Road site where total violent crime counts increased during the treatment period. Initial challenges were identified and adjustments to the PNI strategy were made, including, for example, expanding the DPD working group, developing greater cooperation with and reliance on the Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions (OIPSS), and enhanced intelligence gathering efforts.
- Moving forward, DPD plans to create a second PNI team that will allow it to expand the number of sites undergoing PNI treatment.

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9. Appendix

11700 FERGUSON RD. OPERATIONS PLAN
11500 Ferguson to 11700 Ferguson Rd. and all addresses on Woodmeadow Pkwy.

COMMUNITY INTERVENTION

Problem	Solutions	Timeline	Responsible Party	Action Steps	Process Measurement	Effectiveness Measurement
Lack of Inclusion to abate crime in Business	The NPO unit will establish safety coalition meetings for businesses and apartment communities in the immediate area This will bring all apartment communities to the table to assist in abating crime and listen to their concerns and solutions	Safety coalition meetings to begin March 9	NPO Unit 214-671-4162	Organize safety coalition meetings with the final outcome of creating a SMART business plan to abate crime on property	How many safety coalition meetings are being conducted per month? Attendance at each?	Reduction in reported violent offenses and victims in targeted area
Lack of Security at Businesses	The NPO unit will address security concerns with the property owners and management and work with them to improve their businesses	NPO's meet within 60 days to develop/encourage a security plan at the location	NPO Unit 214-671-4162	Business owner participation and monitor security at location with the final outcome being a SMART security plan to abate crime on property	Was a security plan implemented?	Reduction in reported violent offenses and victims in targeted area Have offenses decreased or

						increased at location? Compare locations with a security plan to locations without pre-post implementation
Homelessness	The Office of Homeless Solutions will perform sweeps through the area and attempt to find housing and shelter for the homeless population	Homeless initiative – 1 month	Office of Homeless Solutions Damian Garcia 214-724-0264	Homeless sweeps done monthly by Homeless Solutions and planning meetings with the final outcome of being a SMART homeless plan to abate homelessness on property	Count of homeless at location monthly Count of how many accept services Number of calls for service regarding homeless activity	Decreased victimization of homeless; fewer arrests of homeless for crimes of violence
Ease of access to escape routes - LBJ / DART	Oncor/DOT have on-going construction in this area. It will take the completion of that construction project to determine if the ease of access to this location is still a contributing factor	Ongoing construction at location 1-2 years	DOT	Meetings with DOT, traffic with the final outcome of being a SMART traffic plan to abate crime on property	TBD depending upon DOT plans and input	TBD
Blight – streets, sidewalk repair/lighting/trash	The Department of Urban Development and Neighborhood Revitalization and OIPSS can provide solutions to aid in the	Street/sidewalk repair – requested by OIPSS Chief Anderson will provide another	Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions (OIPSS)	Meetings with listed groups with the final outcome being a SMART* blight abatement plan to	Development and implementation of SMART blight abatement plan	Before/after visual sight survey of blight (e.g. dilapidated sidewalks, poor

| | revitalization of this neighborhood

The location to be included is the Ferguson Rd corridor and Woodmeadow Parkway | update w/in 30 days from (2-24-22) | 214-671-3905

City Attorney's Office 214-671-3430 | abate crime on property | | lighting; trash; overgrown foliage) |

*SMART – Specific ordinance and/or policy change to improve safety and abate crime

11700 FERGUSON RD. OPERATIONS PLAN
ENFORCEMENT

Problem	Solutions	Timeline	Responsible Party	Action Steps	Process Measurement	Effectiveness Measurement
Narcotics/Gang Problems	1. Narcotics and Gang unit investigations will continue to identify and dismantle criminal networks located within the location. They will also identify locations for covert cameras to aid in intel.

2. Federal agencies will be notified by the Gang Unit and Narcotics if a network is uncovered that may qualify for federal assistance | Narcotics and Gang Units will continue to work cases in the area, monitor the location, and act on intel provided by units across the department and RTCC

2. Federal enforcement – continually assessed start date – based on their availability | 1. Narcotics 214-671-3120 Gang Unit 214-671-4264

2. Re-engage federal partners | Gang and narcotics units operating in the area

2. Develop and prosecute cases federally | Unit activities in the area, including open investigations & arrests

2. Number of cases filed or referred for federal prosecution | Decreased drug sales and violent crimes stemming from drug sales; reduction in gang-related violent crime; Reduction in documented gang members |

| Violent Crime | 1. Re-assigned grid to offender-focused

2. OIPSS can coordinate with other city departments to create equitable policies

3. Improved intel to RTCC

4. Bike unit – abate crime with visual presence; develop rapport with residents and management; develop and share intel | 1. Grid treatment type change immediately

2. Conversations should begin immediately

3. Intel sharing continuous

4.Feb 9, 2022 | 1. Deputy Chief S Ismail 214-670-5304

2. OIPSS – 2.671.3905 DHA 469-249-9012

3. Director Roger Stokes 214-671-3482

4. Sgt. Breanna Valentine | 1. CRT operating in the area

2. Meetings with decision-makers of each department with the final outcome of being a SMART* policy review plan to abate crime on property

3. Improvement in the quality and amount of intel to RTCC.

4. Bike unit assigned and operating in the area | 1. CRT activities in the area, including investigations, stops, arrests

2. Development and implementation of SMART crime abatement plan

3. Number of reports or other intelligence-sharing communications with DPD units operating in the area and RTCC
4. Cases referred to narcotics & gang unit; intel shared | Reduction in monthly counts of violent crimes/victims in the area |

11700 FERGUSON RD. OPERATIONS PLAN
CITY GOVERENED INTERVENTION

Problem	Solutions	Timeline	Responsible Party	Action Steps	Process Measurement	Effectiveness Measurement
Code Violations at Convenience Stores	Code enforcement will complete compliance checks at the convenience stores, address violations with the management and owners, and monitor	Store inspections begin week of 3/21/22	Code Enforcement Opal Hoskins 214-287-5857 OIPSS 214-671-3905	Code compliance checks	Monthly – count of documented violations	Reduced code violations over time

	for compliance. We will also seek solutions from the Office of Economic Development for these business partners in the City of Dallas					
11760 Ferguson Risk Property Qualification	Nuisance Abatement Unit and City Attorney's Office will assess and determine if a risk case will be opened and actions taken on the property	Risk case determination within 90 days	Nuisance Abatement 214-670-4591 City Attorney's Office 214-671-3430	Nuisance abatement investigations	Gain management and owner's cooperation with reducing the amount of abatable crimes at the location	Decrease in abatable offenses over time

3550 E. OVERTON RD. OPERATIONS PLAN
E. Overton, Southern Oaks Blvd., E. Illinois Ave., and Fordham Rd.
COMMUNITY INTERVENTION

Problem	Solutions	Timeline	Responsible Party	Action Steps	Process Measurement	Effectiveness Measurement
Tension between residents and management	1. Office of Community Care can provide resources to both groups.	1. Office of Community Care's assistance, approximately 3-6 months	1. Office of Community Care 214-671-5117 OIPSS (Violence Interrupters) Faith-based organizations (Churches)	1. Meetings between management and residents	1. Number of meetings and number in attendance	Survey of residents to determine the effectiveness of assistance provided and satisfaction with management
	2. NPO unit will establish a group not just for the apartments, but for the neighborhood as a whole. This safety coalition will have regular meetings and establish a rapport with the community and our city	2. Safety coalition meetings are scheduled to begin by the end of February and early March	2. NPO Unit 214-671-4162	2. Establish schedule for monthly safety coalition meetings	2. Number of meetings and number in attendance	
Family violence	1. DPD has begun a program to send police officers out with social workers to high-risk family violence victims in an effort to provide resources to victims.	Family Violence high risk victim initiative is currently in place	1. DPD (Family Violence Outreach program)	Increased use of rec center for workshops, tutoring, events, and play area	1. Number of residents in attendance at family violence workshops/violence interrupter workshops.	Decrease in family violence offenses/ victims at the location
	2. OIPSS has a team of violence interrupters that are able to reach out to community members and provide resources to the location		2. OIPSS David Pughes 214-671-3905		2. Contacts by violence interrupters with	

					community members	
Crime inducing environment	1. DPD to revamp Gold Star Program in partnership with the Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions and the City Attorney's Office. 2. The Office of Equity works internally and externally to build robust community collaborations	Revamping and Initiating the Gold Star Program, approximately 3-6 months	1. DPD NPO 2. OIPSS David Pughes 214-671-3905 City Attorney's Office 214-671-3430 3. Office of Equity equity@dallascityhall.com	Implement Gold Star program	Trainings of management and residents .	Reduction in criminal offenses at the location.
CPTED analysis	Code Compliance will be requested to complete a CPTED analysis for this property and provide those results, feedback, and suggestions to the group for implementation Code has gone through the location and will be providing an update soon on their observations/recommendations at this location	CPTED analysis, as soon as possible	Code Enforcement Opal Hoskins 214-287-5857	Development of CPTED analysis	How many aspects of the CPTED analysis have been complied with or implemented.	Increase in family use/enjoyment of multi-use spaces; reduction in reported violent crime/victims

3550 E. OVERTON RD. OPERATIONS PLAN
ENFORCEMENT

Problem	Solutions	Timeline	Responsible Party	Action Steps	Process Measurement	Effectiveness Measurement
Gangs/violent crime	1. Ongoing operations by DPD gang unit to target and dismantle active gangs in the area 2.CRT operating in the area (offender-focused grid) 3. Intelligence sharing with RTCC 4. DPD will seek federal assistance where it can be utilized to develop strong cases for individuals responsible for crime in this community 5. Bike Unit - abate crime with a visual presence, develop rapport with apartment community members, develop intel regarding the surrounding location	1. Gang Unit is currently working the location and will continue to be included in all intel for the location 2. CRT currently operating at location 3. Ongoing 4. Federal enforcement – continually assessed 5. Feb 9, 2022	1. Gang Unit 214-671-4264 2. Division CRT unit 3. Director Roger Stokes 214-671-3482 4. FBI Dallas 5. Sgt. Breanna Valentine	1. Continued investigation and enforcement by DPD gang unit 2. CRT operating in the area 3. Improve the quality and amount of intel to RTCC 4. Develop and prosecute cases federally 5. Identify offenders and criminal networks operating in the area	1. Gang unit activity; hours worked; gang members identified 2. CRT mark-outs; cases made 3. Number of reports or other intelligence-sharing communications with DPD units 4. Number of cases filed or referred for federal prosecution 5. Cases referred to narcotics & gang unit; networks dismantled	1. Reduction in gang-related violent crime/ Victimization 2. Reduction in monthly counts of violent crimes/victims in the area
Narcotics	Narcotics will be provided with all intel information gained from this location and will assess which intel	Narcotics will continue to be included in all intel for the development of	Narcotics 214-671-3120	Investigation and enforcement by DPD narcotics	Narcotics unit activity, hours worked; gang members identified	Decreased drug sales and crimes stemming from

Problem	Solutions	Timeline	Responsible Party	Action Steps	Process Measurement	Effectiveness Measurement
	is workable intel for their unit	narcotics cases at the location				drug sale violence
Code Violations	Code Enforcement will monitor locations for violations and meet with management to get those rectified in a timely manner	Code Compliance checks, immediate and on-going	Code Enforcement Opal Hoskins 214-287-5857	Reduce spaces that are crime festering	Voluntary compliance with Code requirements and/or citations written/documented	Reduction in code violations
City Attorney's Office/Nuisance Abatement	The City Attorney's Office will continue to monitor this location for a potential Risk case and seek compliance from the management and owners of the location to help abate crime	Risk case determination/currently City Prosecution will not accept this location as a risk property. Many factors could change that.	City Attorney's Office 214-671-3430	Bring this location into compliance	Voluntary compliance and/or nuisances offenses documented	Reduction in number of abatable offenses

3550 E. OVERTON RD. OPERATIONS PLAN
CITY GOVERNED INTERVENTION

Problem	Solutions	Timeline	Responsible Party	Action Steps	Process Measurement	Effectiveness Measurement
Enforce lease violations	The DPD Nuisance Abatement Unit and City Attorney's Office develop a plan and urge the apartment management to enforce their lease requirements. Revamp and implement the Gold Star Program with assistance from the Office of Integrated Public Safety Solutions	All departments above would begin working to implement solutions that can be enacted by their departments immediately and assess the timeframe for completion. The PNI goal for the city governed	1. Nuisance Abatement 214-670-4591 2. City Attorney's Office 214-671-3430	Implementation/enforcement of Gold Star plan and requirements	Compliance with Injunction and enforcement of lease violations	Decrease in problem tenants contributing to crime at the location

		solutions is 3-6 months				
Abandoned Vehicle Removal	Code enforcement to look at all code violations to include inoperable vehicles or abandoned vehicles left on property	Immediately	Code Enforcement Opal Hoskins 214-287-5857	Identification and removal of abandoned vehicles	Gates working properly, code violations rectified, and abandoned vehicles removed	Decrease in number of abandoned vehicles
Loitering	Consider a city ordinance to require all apartment communities to have green space and adequate play structures for children and adults and limit concentrations of apartments in one area	3-6 months	City Council	Security to step up enforcement of property rules against loitering	Number of citations/warnings/ removals for loitering	Fewer calls regarding loitering or suspicious activity
Ineffective management	1. City Attorney's Office to utilize receiverships for complexes that refuse to cooperate and do not help in the crime abatement. 2. The Housing and Neighborhood Revitalization can assist management and the community in building a stronger, fair housing community	3-6 months	1. City Attorney's Office 214-671-3430 2. Housing and Neighborhood Revitalization 214-670-3644	Meetings with management and other city departmental unit	1. Was an injunction or receivership sought? Granted? Denied 2. Surveys at the location to determine tenant satisfaction	Increased tenant satisfaction with management